only a compensation in money for the past? On the one hand, equity will not entertain a bill for the mere purpose of giving a compensation in money for a past tort; and this for two reasons,—namely, first, the remedy at law is perfectly effective; secondly, equity cannot assess damages. On the other hand, if equity does not give relief for the past tort in the case supposed, the burden of two suits will be imposed upon the parties. To avoid this evil, therefore, equity will give relief for the past tort if the plaintiff will accept such relief as equity can give. It is, indeed, possible for equity to give relief for a past tort by way of damages; but it can only do so by sending the case to a court of law for an assessment of damages, and that is quite as objectionable as a separate action. If, however, the tort be one by which the defendant obtains a direct and immediate profit, equity can and will compel him to account with the plaintiff for such profit ; and this relief is commonly preferred to an action for damages. Accordingly, in cases of waste, destructive trespass, and infringement of patents and copyrights, it is the constant practice for the plaintiff to pray for an account as well as an injunction. In cases of nuisance, however, an account is seldom asked for, as there are seldom any profits sufficiently direct and immediate to be accounted for.
The next question is, In what cases will equity compel the specific reparation of torts already committed? This question can arise, of course, only in reference to such torts as are in their nature capable of being specifically repaired; and it does not often arise, except in reference to torts committed by the defendant on his own land (i.e., nuisances); for in other cases the plaintiff may generally as well recover damages of the defendant, and then repair the tort himself.
It must be confessed that the ordinary mode of giving relief in equity is not as well adapted to specific reparation as it is to prevention. It is scarcely possible, in the nature of things, for a court successfully to compel the performance of specific affirmative acts, unless they be of a very precise and definite character, such, for example, as paying money, producing documents, delivering possession of property, and executing conveyances of property; and clearly a court ought to be very cautious about attempting what it cannot successfully carry out. It is singular, therefore, that courts of equity have confined themselves so exclusively to their favorite mode of giving relief. In cases where
