l86 HARVARD LAW REVIEW, Bflls and Notes — Guaranty operating as Indorsement. — The payee of a negotiable note indorsed it: "I guaranty the within note, waiving notice of protest and demand." Held, that these words operated as an indorsement and not as a mere assign- ment. Dunham v. Peterson, 67 N. W. Rep. 293 (N. Dak.). The view taken seems to be that the guaranty over the signature in no way prevents the signature from operating as an indorsement; that the writer is "an indorser with enlarged liability." The difficulty with such a view is that the signature is affixed to and really forms part of the guaranty, and a guaranty is not a negotiation of a note. See Tuttle v. Bartholomew, 12 Mete. 454; Trust Co. v. National Bank, loi U. S. 68. The latter decision also indicates that under so unusual a form of transfer, if it be assumed to be valid, the transferee should not take free from equitable defences possessed by the maker. Carriers — Invalid Ticket — Ejection. — A passengerbought an excursion ticket to A, which on its face read that in order to be good for the return trip, it must be stamped by an agent at A. No agent could be found by the passenger, and so he ten- dered the unstamped ticket for his return passage. Upon the conductor's declining to accept it, he refused to pay fare, and was put off. Held, he could not recover in tres- pass for his ejection. Western Maryland R. Co. v. Stocksdale, 11 All. Rep. 8S0 (Md ). The decision seems sound. A recent Indiana case, however, in which the facts were almost identical with the above, reached the opposite result. I'ut the doctririie of the Maryland case has the weight both of principle and authority in its support. 9 Harvard Law Review, 353 ; Hutchinson's Law of Carriers, 2d ed., § 580 h. Strong considerations of policy favor the rule, now pretty generally recognized, that a ticket is a formal contract, and that the conductor is justified in basing his action upon its express terms, regardless of any explanations to the contrary by the holder. If this be the correct view, there was no wrong in the ejection. The passenger could and should have avoided it by simply paying his fare, which he would subsequently recover from the railroad. Selling him an imperfect ticket was the company's real wrong, and for this he has his appropriate remedy. Carriers — Liability for Baggage. — The defendant company received the baggage of the plaintiff, having been misled by the act of a third party into the belief that the plaintiff was going to take passage over their line. The plaintiff in fact went by another route, his baggage being lost by the negligence of the defendant while in transit. Held, that since the defendant intended to receive the baggage only as baggage accompanying the passenger and without other charge, they did not receive it as common carriers, that their duty of care was less than that of any class of bailees, and that their negligence in this case was not so gross as to entail liability. Beers v. Boston & Albany R. R. Co., 34 Atl. Rep. 541 (Conn.). No authority in point is cited in support of this decision and it seems at least questionable. No matter how mistaken the defendant was, a voluntary bailee of the baggage for transportation and on full knowledge of the facts could have demanded freight and have retained the goods under a lien for payment. Hutchinson on Car- riers, §§ I, 19. This being so, they owed a carrier's duty to the owner of the goods, and should be held liable for their loss. Constitutional Law — Ability of Congress to pay Debts founded on Moral Considerations. — Held, the Act of Congress appropriating a certain sum to sugar manufacturers who would have been entitled to bounties under the Tariff Act of 1890, had it not been repealed in 1894, is valid and constitutional, irrespective of the constitutionality of the original bounty provision. United States v. Realty Co., 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1120. The case is interesting, aside from its containing a summary of sugar legislation, as showing the nature of debts which Congress is authorized to pay. Such debts include not only claims of such a nature as to be legally enforceable againsc an individual, but also moral obligations founded on equitable or honorable considerations. Assuming the unconstitutionality of the provision authorizing the payment of sugar bounties, yet there is such an honorable obligation on the part of the government towards those who, in good faith altered their position in reliance upon that act, that an appropri- ation for their benefit is to be regarded as the payment of a " debt " in a moral and equitable sense. In deciding whether the facts of a given case bring it within the class of obligations founded on moral considerations Congress must be its own judge, and its decision can rarely if ever be reviewed by the judiciary. Constitutional Law — Freedom of Speech. — The performance of a play, based on the facts of a murder case on trial will not be enjoined, such action being in violation of the constitutional provision as to freedom of speech and of the press. Dailey v. Superior Courts 44 Pac. Rep. 458 (Cal.). See Notes.
