192 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. owner it fell and killed plaintiff's daughter who was passing. Held, that the contrac- tor was not liable for injuries to the passers by. Dougherty v. Herzog, 44 N. E. Rep. 457 (Ind.). Plaintiff was the guest of a member of a social club which had hired a coach of de- fendant for an excursion. Through defendant's negligence the coach broke down, in- juring plaintiff. Held, that defendant was liable to guests of the club, since it must have been the understanding that guests were to use the coach, and in so doing they were merely carrying out a right which the club members had under the contract. Glenn v. Winters, 40 N. Y. Supp. 659. In cases of this sort, most courts follow Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, and refuse to allow recovery by any one not a party to the contract. For instance, in Cnrtin v. Somerset, 140 Pa. St. 70, the builder of a hotel was held not liable for injuries caused by his negligence to a guest. Where, however, the article is dangerous to hu- man life, the right of recovery is extended to any user of it, as in case of medicine with a wrong label. Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397. Though this exception is well settled by authority, it seems illogical. Outside this narrow class < f cases it is very difficult to make any extension on principle which does not work injustice in practice and en- courage frivolous suits. The extension suggested in Glenn v. Winters, as stated above, seems a good one if strictly interpreted, though it cannot be reconciled with Cnrtin v. Somerset, supra. But no court has yet gone so far as to allow recovery in a case like Dougherty v. Herzog [supra], where the plaintiff's daughter was in no way connected with the contracting parties. Torts — Recaption of Goods. — Defendant entered plaintiff's house without plainliff's consent by force of a warrant to search for goods of his which had been wrongfully taken there by plaintiff; and while there he took also other goods which he had bailed to plaintiff. Held, that a license to enter to take the bailed goods was to be implied from the fact that the plaintiff had allowed them to be put there. Madden V. Brown, 40 N. Y. Supp. 714. As the bailed goods were not covered by the warrant, the plaintiff in taking them became a trespasser ab initio, unless he could justify entry to take them without the warrant. Although it is doubtful how far a court would go to-day in sustaining the doctrine of trespass ab initio, the view taken by the court made the decision of that question unnecessary. There is no question as to the right to enter even a man's house to retake goods wrongfully taken there by him. But as to goods not wrongfully taken the correctness of the case is not so certain. In the cases of that sort where entry has been allowed, the ground is taken that a license to enter is to be implied from the rela- tions of the parties. As, for instance, where goods are sold to be delivered on the premises. And the Massachusetts courts are inclined to restrict this doctrine very closely. McLeod v. Jones, 105 Mass. 405. There is a dictum of Littleton, J., often cited, in which he denies the right to enter a man's house to retake bailed goods. Note to Webb v. Beavan, 6 M. & G. 1055. The New York court seems to have gone very far in implying a license to enter from the mere fact of a bailment which had terminated. Trusts — Constructive. — A wife, receiving funds of her own, paid them over to her husband, without more. He invested them in land, telling her that he had invested the funds for her, but taking the title in himself. On his death it was sought to have the land declared a resulting trust. Held, that for a trust there must have been a con- tract or special promise by the husband to invest the funds for her, and his statements to her were not sufficient. Nashville Trust Co. v. Lansom's Heirs, 36 S. W. Rep. 977 (Tenn.). Where the money is furnished by one person and the title taken in the name of an- other, it is generally declared a constructive trust. Lloyd v. Spillett, 2 Atk. 150. It is presumed that the stranger was not intended to enjoy the beneficial interest. Yet it may be shown by extrinsic evidence that the full benefit was bestowed. Rider v. Kid- der, 10 Ves. 360. And so where the purchaser takes the title in the name of some member of his family, the fact of the relation is supposed to rebut the resulting trust, and establish a presumption that the holder of the title was intended to take the entire interest, i Perry on Trusts, 4th ed., § 143. But this presumption is based upon the " moral, natural, or legal obligation to provide " for the nominal purchaser ; and no such obligation here seems to rest upon the wife. Yet, waiving that objection, it is gen- erally held that evidence may repel the presumption arising from the family relation ; Butler v. Ins. Co., 14 Ala. 777 ; and the question is regarded as one of intention. Dyer V. Dyer, 2 Cox, 94. So that the propriety of this decision, that there must be a clear contract or promise by the husband, is at least doubtful. Moulton v. Haley, 57 N. H. 184. Trusts — Resulting — Statute of Frauds. — In a deed conveying land which is absolute in its terms and contains the usual declaration of uses in favor of the
