248 HARVARD LAW REVIEW, The weight of authority is perhaps opposed to the principal case, holding that a corporation is an artificial person, and like a person, should be able to prefer its credit- ors. Morowetz on Corp., § 802. In reply to this it is said, that the directors can only dispose of the company's funds as prescribed in the charter. When business ceases to be carried on, and the company is insolvent, it is an implied condition that the money shall be held as a fund for the benefit of creditors and stockholders. Unless it is absolutely necessary it is surely unwise to extend further the doctrine of preference, of doubtful advantage as exercised by individuals. If it is extended it would seem logically that directors might be able to prefer themselves. Corporations — Suspension of Members. — Relator was a member of a volun- tary incorporated organization owning property, its charter giving it a right of expulsion of members as might be directed in its by-laws. Having been charged and convicted by the board of directors, according to its by-laws, of an offence punishable by expulsion or suspension, relator attempted to compel his reinstatement by mandamus. Held, that under such circumstances the determination of the board of directors could not be reviewed. Board of Trade v. A^elson, 44 N. E. Rep. 743 (111.)- The decision is undoubtedly correct. The relator should be held bound by the judg- ment of a tribunal authorized by the charter of the corporation to which he has volun- tarily submitted himself upon becoming a member of the corporation, when that tribunal acts in good faith and after notice and opportunity for full hearing. Com. v. Pike Befiev. Soc, 8 W. & S. 247. It is probable that this decision, together with that in Pitcher v. Board of Trade, 121 111. 412, holding that chancery will not interfere in such cases, will put an end to a vast amount of litigation in the courts of common law and of equity in Illinois, attempting to subject the power of expulsion by such corporations, regularly exercisedj to the revision of the courts. Criminal Law — Evidence. — Held, that on a trial for murder, evidence of the violent and dangerous character of the deceased might be introduced by defendant to prove self-defence and to show that defendant acted under such circumstances as would cause a reasonable man to believe himself in imminent danger, but that it was admissible only where it gave significance to the conduct of deceased at the time of the killing; and defendant must first show such conduct by deceased as, though innocent if considered independently of the violent character of deceased, yet when considered in connection with such character, would arouse a reasonable belief of imminent peri! ; that defendant might lay the basis for the introduction of such testimony as to character by his own evidence as to the conduct of deceased. Na7-t v. State, 20 So. Rep. 805 (Fla.). The decision represents the weight of authority upon this exception to the general rule that it is inadmissible for the defendant to put the character of deceased in issue. The admission of such evidence, after a foundation for it has been laid by the pre- liminary proof demanded, appears proper as showing the belief of defendant as to the probability of attack, and its character. Hurdv. People, 25 Mich. 405. Massachusetts, however, refuses to admit such evidence. Hilliard v. Com., 2 Gray, 294. It may be questioned if the last decision would stand should the point again be raised, as a former decision upon an allied matter, viz., a refusal to allow the introduction of proof of the extraordinary muscular development of deceased, in Com. v. Mead, 12 Gray, 167, was overruled in Com. v. Barnacle, 134 Mass. 215. Criminal Law — Former Acquittal. — Held, that a general verdict of acquittal after plea of not guilty to an indictment charging murder, not objected to before verdict, is a bar to a second indictment for the same offence. Ball v. U. S.^ 163 U. S. 622; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. II 92. See Notes, Deeds — Acknowledgment before Interested Officer. — Plaintiffs, husband and wife, executed a trust deed of land in favor of defendant corporation, as security for a loan. Bill to enjoin foreclosure on the ground that the acknowledgment, which was before a notary, who was also a director in defendant corporation, was void. Injunction refused. Held, that such an acknowledgment, while open to grave suspicion of fraud or undue influence, is not void per se. Cooper v. Hamiltoti Loan Association, 37 S. W. Rep. 12 (Tenn.). Taking a married woman's acknowledgment of her deed is commonly considered a judicial, not a ministerial, act. Such acknowledgments before an interested party are therefore in most States held void. In Tennessee, however, even a judgment rendered by a related or interested party is not void {Holmes v. Eason, 8 Lea, 754), and the same rule is naturally followed in regard to acknov/ledgments. While this may perhaps suffi- ciently protect the married woman from fraud and undue influence, it must be admitted that such acts on the part of an interested officer are to be deprecated, and can be checked most effectively by treating them strictly as void.
