252 HARVARD LAW REVIEW, power to impose such a tax on the stock, but not on the bonds, of a domestic corpora- tion owned by a non-resident decedent and bequeathed to a non-resident, the certifi- cates being kept out of the State, In re Bronson, 44 N. E. Rep. 707 ; to impose such a tax on the bonds of a foreign corporation, owned and bequeathed in like manner, when the bonds are actually on deposit within the State, In re Whiting's Estate, ib. 715; to impose such a tax on a non resident's deposit in a New York trust company, In re Hondayer's Estate, ib. 718. See Notes. Torts — Assault — Reasonable Fear. — Defendant fired a revolver near the plaintiff but not at him, intending merely to frighten him, not to do bodily harm, so that plaintiff was frightened, became sick, and suffered physically. Held, that defend- ant was not liable. Degenhardt v. Heller, 68 N. W. Rep. 411 (Wis.). The court here proceed upon the ground that an intent merely to frighten is not a sufiicient wrong on the part of the defendant to make him liable, and for sup- port a number of definitions are cited to the effect that an intent to inflict bodily harm is a necessary element of assault. But this view seems opposed to the better opinion. It is well recognized law that the pointing of a pistol by one who knows it to be unloaded with intent only to frighten is enough to make the defendant liable. In Com. v. White, no Mass. 407, it was held that the ruling was properly refused that defendant must have had the intent to inflict bodily harm. On this point the decision in the principal case seems wrong, and the only ground on which it might be supported is that the plaintiff's injury was not such as the law would notice, namely, that he was not put in fear of bodily harm, but was frightened merely by the noise of the explosion. " The essence of the wrong is putting the man in present fear of violence." Pollock on Torts, 4th ed. 198. Torts — Contract with Third Party — Liability for Resulting Damage:. — Under an agreement with the defendant, a railroad company constructed a switch to defendant's mills along a street in front of plaintiffs house. Held, that defendant was liable for injury done to property owners. Paiton v. Olympia Door &^ Lumber Co., 46. Pac. Rep. 237 (Wash.). The defence in this case was, that it was not the defendant who constructed and ran the switch, but the railroad company. But the court answered this objection by saying that the railroad company ran the cars under an agreement with the defendant to do so and for his benefit. How far this principle of liability might be extended is a question of some interest, but there seems to be little doubt that the court was correct in going as far as it did. Torts — Negligence — Legal Cause. — Defendant railway negligently blocked the street with a freight train. Plaintiff in trying to pass around the engine, tripped while still in the street, and fell, breaking her wrist. Held, that defendant's negli- gence was not the legal cause of the injury, since the fall was "neither the natural nor the usual result to be expected," Enochs v. Fitfsintrg Ry. Co., 44 N, E, Rep. 658 (Ind,). Defendant, a gas company, knowingly allowed its mains to fall out of repair, so that gas escaped through the earth into a basement and exploded, killing plaintiff's intestate. Held, that defendant's negligence was the legal cause of the explosion, which was " one of the natural results," one " which the defendant was bound to an- ticipate.'* Alexandria Co. v, Irish, 44 N, E, Rep. 680 (Ind.). These cases are clearly right. It is to be observed, however, that between them lies the class of cases where the result, while following in the course of nature, is not such as any one would consider probable. On such cases the Indiana court may some time find it necessary to draw a sharper line of distinction. Torts — Physical Suffering Resulting from Mental Shock, — Plaintiff, through mental excitement and fright, became incapacitated for work. Held, he could recover under the terms of a policy insuring him absolutely for all accidents, however caused, occurring in the fair and ordinary discharge of his duty, Pugh v. London, Brighton and South Coast Railway Co., [1896] 2 Q, B, 248. See Notes. Trusts — Right to Contribution as between Co-Trustees — Statute of Limitations, — The plaintiff, who was trustee of a marriage settlement, allowed the trust fund to be in the hands of his co-trustee, the defendant, for investment. The defendant intrusted the whole fund to an "outside" stockbroker, who applied a portion of it to his own use. In an action by the plaintiff and the infant cestuis, defendant claimed contribution against the plaintiff trustee. The stockbroker was employed by defendant in 1885. Held, that the right to contribution creates a debt, but that such right does not come into existence until the cestiti has obtained judg- ment against the trustee so claiming contribution. Consequently, defendant's claim
