THE NATURE OF CONSIDERATION. 259 that will suffice? It is true that in Rann v. Hughes^ the executor was not held liable on his special promise; but neither forbearance nor receipt of assets was even alleged in that case; so that no consideration of any kind was claimed to exist. Again, if a devisee of land, which is charged by the testator with the payment of a pecuniary legacy, expressly promises to pay the same, the promise may be enforced at law by the legatee. Beeker v. Beeker ; ^ Van Orden v. Van Orden ; ^ Kelsey v. Keyo ; * Tole V. Hardy.^ But surely the legatee gives nothing for such promise; and without it he could not recover at law; so that the express promise is the only ground of liability. Pelletrace v, Rathbone.^ If a depositor in a bank gives his creditor his check thereon, in payment of his claim, and the bank expressly promises such holder to pay the check to him, he can maintain an action against the bank for a subsequent refusal to do so. Why? What considera- tion does such promisee furnish the bank in exchange for the promise? What loss is sustained, what right parted with, what obligation assumed, what change of status suffered by the prom- isee? If A assigns to C a claim against B, and B expressly prom- ises C to pay the same to him, C can recover upon that promise in his own name. Why? What consideration does C give B for the new promise? That such new promise must have a new con- sideration to support it is clear. Is not the consideration found in the fact that the promisor is, after such promise, no longer liable to a suit by the assignor and original creditor, and so some gain or advantage results or is supposed to result to him, but without any loss to the promisee? Burroughs v. Glover J And see Liver- side V, Broadbent.^ What consideration does a gratuitous indorsee and holder of a negotiable note advance, that enables him to enforce payment against the maker, where the latter has received a valuable con- sideration from the payee? Is not the sole consideration the benefit received by the promisor without any loss sustained by the promisee? Is not the acceptor of a draft liable to the drawee, if at all, because he has received, or is conclusively supposed to have received, a valuable consideration from the drawer; and not 1 4 Brown P. C. 27 ; 7 T. R. 350, note (1778). * 6 Cow. 333 (1826). a 7 Johns. 99 (1810). « 18 Johns. 428 (1821). 8 10 Johns. 30 (1813). ' 106 Mass. 325.
- 3 Cow. 133 (1824). « 4 H. & N. 610.
