RECENT CASES. 309 the agreement. P., however, applied on behalf of C. for the shares, and the company alloted them, and placed him on the register. Held, that C. was not entitled to have his name removed from the register, inasmuch as the authority given to P., for suffi- cient consideration, was an authority coupled with an interest, and therefore not revocable. In re Hannan*s Empress Gold Mining 6- Development Co., [1896] 2 Ch. 643. It is well settled that an authority coupled with an interest is irrevocable; but the courts have been unable to settle upon a comprehensive and precise definition of an interest. See Mechem on Agency, §§ 204-207, collectmg authorities; Anson on Con- tracts, 263-265; Parsons on Contracts, 8th ed., *69; opinion of Marshall, C. J., in Hunt V. Kotismanier,% Wheat. 174. The decision in the principal case is clearly within the broad principle stated by Wilde, C. J., in Smart v. Sanders, 5 C. B. 917, to the effect that an authority coupled with an interest exists, and is irrevocable, " where an agree- ment is entered into on sufficient consideration, whereby an authority is given for the purpose of conferring some benefit on the donee of that authority." In the language of Lopes, L. J., "The object was to enable Mr. Phillips, the vendor, to obtain his purchase money, and it therefore conferred a benefit on the donee of the authority." But see Anson on Contracts, 264. Attorney AND Client — Action for Money Collected — Statute of Lim- itations—Trusts. — An attorney collected money for his client by effecting the settlement of a suit. Two days later he informed the client, and promised to pay it over as soon as he had settled certain contingent fees. The client refused to ratify the settlement or to accept the money, and during the pendency of proceedings to have the settlement set aside the attorney continued to hold the money. Suit was brought to recover it, and the statute of limitations was set up as a bar. Held, that the relations between the attorney and the client did not constitute a technical and continuing trust alone cognizable in equity and exempt from the statute ; and that the action was barred after the lapse of four years from the time the attorney gave notice of the collection. Sc/iofieldw. IVoolley, 25 S. E. Rep. 769 (Ga.). Constructive trusts are not exempt from the operation of the statute of limitations, as in the case of trusts cognizable alone in equity. See 2 Wood on Limitations, §§ 200. 215, anJ a recent case, Raihvay Co. v. Stillwattr, 68 N. W. Rep. 836. It would seem that the court, in the principal case, rightly viewed this as at most a constructive trust, and cor- rectly held that the attorney, as an agent liable at law, was entitled to set up the statute. See I Wood on Lim., § 18 ; Godefroi's Trustees, 309. Various views obtain, however, as to when the statute should begin to run. See i Wood on Lim., chap. X. It has been held in New York that where the attorney notifies the client of the collection, as in the principal case, the statute does not begin to run until the client has had a rea- sonable time in which to make demand. Lyle v. Murray, 4 Sandf. 590. On the other hand, it has been held in Pennsylvania, in agreement with the principal case, that under such circumstances the statute runs from the time of notice. McDowell v. Potter^ 8 Pa. St. 189. Bills and Notes — Demand Note — When Claim against Indorse^i is BAKRED. — A demand note with interest payable annually was indorsed by the payee to the plaintiff on the day it was made. 'I'he plaintiff did not present it to the maker for payment until ten years after its date. Payment being refused, the plaintiff noti- fied his indorser, and seeks to recover from him the amount of the note. Held, a demand note, whether with or without interest, does not mature as to an indorser until demand is actually made, but that demand must be within a reasonable time. Leonardo. Olson, 68 N. W. Rep. 677 (Iowa). In England and in New York such a note as this is regarded as a continuing secur- ity which does not mature until payment is demanded. Brooks v. Mitchell, 9 M. & W. 15; Merritt v. Todd, 23 N. Y. 28. Hut the anomalous doctrine that a demand note is due immediately, without any demand, has furnished ground for argument that the indorsee who does not present such note for payment on the day he receives it loses his rights against the indorsers. The courts have not adopted this rule strictly, but have held, as in the principal case, that presentment within a reasonable time is sufficient. 2 Ames's Cases, on Bills and Notes, 291. Bills and Notes —Failure of Consideration — Sales — Rescission. — Held, that a promissory note given for a pony, the title to the pony to remain in the vendor until payment of the note, and the vendee having the option to rescind the sale before the note is due, is void for failure of consideration, where the pony died before the option was exercised. Lvon v. Stills, yj S. W. Rep. 280 (Tcnn.). This case stands or falls according to whether the risk of loss was on the vendee or vendor. The principal case is contra to the better view, that it was on the vendee, and
