RECENT CASES. 31 1 the association as of Syracuse, N. Y., and declaring the notes payable at its office there. Held, that the contract was not governed l)y the usury laws of Pennsylvania- Benuet v. Eastern Building ^ Loan Co., 35 Atl. Rep. 634 (Pa.). There is much confusion among the authorities on this question. On principle, the decision seems wrong. The sovereign power in Pennsylvania has declared usurious contracts to be illegal. Such contracts, made in Pennsylvania, never acquire a legal existence. "They are not only void in that State, but void in every State, and every- where." Akers v. Demand, 103 Mass. 323; Scudder. Union Bank, 91 U. S. 406. 10 Harvard Law Review, 170. Constitutional Law — Bi-Parttsan Police Commission. — ^^/</, that a statute providing for the election by a city council of four police commissioners, and requiring that two be chosen from each of the two leading political parties in the council, is unconstitutional. Rathbone v. Wirth, 45 N. E. Rep. 15 (N. Y.). See Notes. Contracts — Statute of Frauds. — The defendant made an offer in writing to agents of the plaintiff to buy a parcel of land, saying that, if his offer was accepted, he would sign a certain draft contract, the contents of which were known to him. The agents accepted the offer, and, inserting the vendor's name, sent the draft contract to the defendant. It was never signed, and on suit for specific performance by vendor, it was held that vendee could not plead the statute of frauds. Filby v. Hounsell [1896] 2 Ch. 737. The defendant claimed that he had not signed anything which directly or sufficiently set forth who the vendor was. But the offer of the defendant contains the names of the contracting parties, and this is sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds. Who the principals are may be proved by extrinsic evidence. Morris v. Wilson, 5 Jur. (n. S.) 16S. If it may be looked on as settled that an agent may accept without disclosing his principal, it matters not that the defendant did not sign the draft contract, since it had been particularly referred to by him in his written offer which was accepted by the agent. Morris v. Wilson, supra. Corporations — Expulsion of Members. — Relator, a member of a club incor- porated for social purposes, being dissatisfied with the rejection of a candidate for membership, sent a circular to the other members, setting forth the rejection and urging the calling of a special meeting. Relator was notified to appear before the board of directors and give an explanation of his conduct. He appeared, was heard, and was expelled. Held, that a mandamus would issue to review the proceedings of the board of directors. People v. Up-Town Assoc, 41 N. Y. Supp. 154. In its opinion, the court concedes that the directors had power to annul relator's membership for conduct which might, in their judgment, endanger the welfare or char- acter of the club. This alone would seem to vest so broad a discretion in the direc- tors as would render a review by the courts inadvisable. On a similar question in the case of a commercial organization, a contrary result was reached very recently in Illi- nois. Board of Trade v. Nelson^ 44 N. E. Rep. 743. It is submitted that the decision of the principal case is against the great weight of authority, to the effect that where the charter or rules provide a certain method of disfranchisement for specific causes, the assent of the member thereto being a fundamental condition of membership, the courts will not on mandamus examine into the merits of a decision of expulsion after the member has been regularly tried under such rules. High Ex. Rem., § 291 ; Spil- man v. Supreme Council, 157 Mass. 128. Th^ principal case is analogous to the very exceptional action of the New York court in issuing a writ of mandamus to compel the granting of a college degree. See 9 Harvard Law Review, 536. Corporations — Notice — Imputed Knowledge of the Common Officer OF Two Companies. — A company borrowed money of a society, but the meeting authorizing the borrowing was held irregularly. The secretary of the company was the secretary of the society and knew of this irregularity. Held, in proceedings for the winding up of the company, that the knowledge of the secretary could not be imputed to the society, and that the claim for the money lent could be proved at the winding up of the company. /;/ re Hampshire Land Co., [1896] 2 Ch. 743. The court follow the case of In re Marseilles Extension Co., L. R. 7 Ch. 161, laying down the rule that, unless the common officer had some duty imposed on him, either by the company of whose irregularity he had knowledge to give such notice, or by the company alleged to be affected by the notice to receive such notice, then his knowledge is not to be imputed. The case of Gale v. Le^ois, 9 Q. B. 730. is distinguished on the latter ground. The line here drawn marks a clear and logical stopping place in this branch of the subject of imputed knowledge.
