RECENT CASES. 315 Property — Covenant to Insure in Lease, — The lessee covenanted to insure the premises, and if they were destroyed by fire to apply the insurance to rebuilding, or pay it over to the lessor, at his option. Held, that the covenant ran with the land, and Dound the assignee. A^orthern Trust Co. v. Snyder^ 76 Fed. Kep. 34. The case goes one step beyond that of Vernon v. Smith, 5 B. & Aid. i, which holds that such a covenant to insure and rebuild runs with the land, in that in the prin- cipal case the lessor has the option of taking the money and not rebuilding. The court is clearly correct in its decision, for the alternative provision plainly concerns the use and occupation of the land. The more interesting question whether a covenant to insure only would run is left undecided, but the court intimates that, as a contract of insurance is a personal one of indemnity, therefore it probably would not run. Property — Donatio Mortis Causa — Delivery Antecedent to Gift. — Held, that an antecedent delivery with a different intent is sufi5cient to support a sihseq}ient donatio mortis causa. Cain v. Moon^ [1896] 2 Q. B. 283. See Notes. Property — Rescission of Sale — Collateral Agreement. — The agent of a land company sold and conveyed a lot, agreeing without authority to sell no lots at a snialler price. On the company's selling lots to others for less, the vendee seeks to recover his purchase notes, offering to reconvey the land. Held, that as the company would not have obtained his purchase without the promise, they cannot take the benefits of the contract without the burdens, and the collateral agreement may be proved. Kackemann v. River Bank Improvement Co., 44 N. E. Rep. 990 (Mass.). The vendee accepted one entire offer from the agent (Pollock on Contracts, 6th ed., 38), and if that offer was unauthorized, it must be ratified or rejected in its entirety by the vendor, benefits and burdens alike. Mechem on Agency, § 775. The deed alone was not intended to cover the whole contract, for the collateral promise was a part of it, and so should be provable. Stephen Dig. Ev., art. 90. Then, as the whole contract cannot be enforced, and the parties can be placed in their former position, equity will rescind the contract and order the consideration repaid, the plaintiff reconveying the land. 2 Poraeroy, Equity, § 869. Property — Supplementary Proceedings — Exemptions. — Held, the accrued wages of an employee of a city fire department cannot, on grounds of public policy, be got at by supplementary proceedings. Sandwich Manuf. Co. v. Krake, 68 N. V. Rep. 606 (Minn.). A pension or salary given to an individual as compensation for a continuing public duty or service is held, on grounds of public policy, to be non-assignable. Wells v. Foster, 8 M. & W. 149; Bliss v. Lawrence^ 58 N, Y. 442; contra. State v. Hastings, 15 Wis. 75. When, however, the salary, or part of it, has become due and payable, and the ])ublic ofiicial may get it on demand, it is difficult to perceive the grounds of public policy which forbid his assigning his right. " If the question had l)een whether or not the pay which was actually due might be assigned, I should have thought it like any other debt, assignable." BuUer, J., in Flarty v. Odium, 3 T. R. 681. If such right be assignable, it would seem that it might be reached in supplementary proceedings ; but the opposite doctrine seems to be established in Minnesota. Roeller v. Ames, 22 N. W. Rep. 177. Property — Vesting of Legacies. — Bequest in trust for testator's wife for life, and after her death the principal to be divided among the testator's phildren when they reach twenty-one, or, if any die, to their issue ; and the income on each one's presump- tive share, in the mean while, or such part as the trustees should think fit, to be applied to his or her maintenance. Some of the children died without issue before reaching twenty-one. Held, that there was not enough to show the testator's intention to vest the legacies before twenty-one. In re Wintle. [1896] 2 Ch. 711. The decision is important as declining to follow Fox v. Fox. L. R. 19 Eq. 286. There is an accepted rule of construction, that whatever lie the wording by which theprinci|>al is given, a gift of the interest vests the principal at once. Clobherie's Case, 2 Ventr. 342. But where the interest is given as maintenance there is still some doubt. /// re Ash- more's Trusts, L. R. 9 Flq. 99. Now in Fox v. Fox a right to apply part only of the income did not prevent the court from deciding that the whole interest was given with a discretion as to how much to apply, and so the principal vested. It would certainly seem that the same wording should not prevent the court in the principal case from concluding that the whole income was not intended to be given. Nevertheless, while rules of construction originate as interpretations of intention, they are often to be followed as rules of law; and the meaning of words is d.cided with reference to their similarity to construed words, rather than with regard to tht ir meaning as bare vehicles of intention. But as Fox v. Fox was not an unquestioned decision, the court thought
