362 HARVARD LAW REVIEW, form of the argument may be, — whether pure development of principle without the citation of a single authority (Allcard v. Skinner^), or elaborate analysis and review of a mass of conflicting cases (Phillips v. Homfray,^ Mitchell v. Darley Main Colliery Co.^), a perfect example of systematic logic (Ratcliffe v. Evans,* Quartz Hill Gold Mining Co. v. Eyre^), or a series of detailed answers to specific points urged in argument (Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co.^), statutory construction (Hewlett v. Allen,^ Thomas v. Quartermaine^), or argument on the facts (Medawar v. Grand Hotel Co.,^ Abrath v. Northeastern Ry. Co.^^), — we invari- ably find the same characteristic precision, sense of proportion, force and completeness of logic. Whatever the form might be, the result was well described by him in the course of his opinion in /;/ re Portuguese, &c. Mines : ^^ "' As soon as one applies one's mind to dissect the ingenious argument, the light breaks through and makes the case perfectly plain." ^^ 1 36 Ch. D. 145. 6 II Q. B. D. 674. 9 [1891] 2 Q. B. II. 2 24 Ch. D. 439. 6 [1893] I Q. B. 256. 10 II Q. B. D. 440. 8 14 Q. B. D. 125. 7 [1892] 2 Q. B. 663. 11 45 Ch. D. 60. 4 [1892] 2 Q. B. 524. 8 18 Q. B. D. 685. 12 Let me cite an example of simple exposition. In the case of Smith v. Land & House Property Corporation, 28 Ch. D. 14, the vendee under a contract for the sale of certain property was resisting an action for specific performance on the ground of mis- representation, the vendor having stated that the property was let to " a most desirable tenant," when in fact the tenant had been in arrears on his last quarter's rent, and soon afterward went into liquidation : — " It is material to observe that it is often fallaciously assumed that a statement of opinion cannot involve the statement of a fact. In a case where the facts are equally well known to both parties, what one of them says to another is frequently nothing but an expression of opinion. The statement of such opinion is in a sense a statement of a fact about the condition of a man's own mind, but only of an irrelevant fact, for it is of no consequence what the opinion is. But if the facts are not equally well known to both sides, then a statement of opinion by the one who knows the facts best involves very often a statement of a material fact, for he impliedly states that he knows facts which justify his opinion. Now a landlord knows the relations between himself and his tenant ; other persons either do not know them at all or do not know them equally well, and if the landlord says that he considers that the relations between himself and his tenant are satisfactory, he really avers that the facts peculiarly within his knowl- edge are such as to render that opinion reasonable. Now are the statements here statements which involve such a representation of material facts .? They are state- ments on a subject as to which prima facie the vendors know everything and the pur- chasers nothing. The vendors state that the property is let to a most desirable tenart, what does that mean ? I agree that it is not a guaranty that the tenant will go on paying his rent, but it is to my mind a guaranty of a different sort, and amounts at least to an assertion that nothing has occurred in the relations between the landlord and the tenant which can be considered to make the tenant an unsatisfactory one. That is an assertion of a specific fact. Was it a true assertion ? Having regard to
