382 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. Corporations — Liability of Stockholders — Transfer of Stock. — Held, that one who has given notice to a corporation to transfer his stock on their books will not be liable as a stockholder on an assessment. Cox v. Elmendorf, yj S. W. Rep. 387 (Penn.). In bringing his bill, the receiver enforces the rights of the corporation against its stockholders. Defendant is legally a stockholder, but only because of the negligence of the corporation, and therefore, unless there is something peculiar about the case, it would seem as if equity would require the corporation to make the transfer which would release the defendant. Mr. Taylor, in his work on corporations, considers that the case is exceptional. He says that the receiver represents the creditors as well as the corporation ; that the stockholder in putting his name on the books alleges that he will be liable to pay up assessments ; that on this statement the creditor has a right to rely. But, as a matter of fact, the stockholder does not make such a representation. He simply says that he or his transferee will be liable. Every creditor knows that the corporation which pays the debt will probably not be composed of the same persons as the corporation which borrowed, and so cannot complain because defendant is released and his assignee substituted. Corporations — Railroads — Execution. — Held, that the portion of the right of way of a railroad passing through a county may be sold on execution for the payment of taxes upon it. Purefgy v. Lamar^ 20 So. Rep. 975 (Ala.). Though the right of a railroad in its road-way is generally an easement only, it has been held none the less alienable. As an easement in gross, it is sometimes considered as granted to the public, whom any railroad company may represent. Pierce on Rail- roads, 528, 529 ; 2 Wood on Railroads, 901. But a more satisfactory view is that it is an easement appurtenant to the whole property of the railroad company, and so alienable with that. Junction Ry. v. Ritggles, 7 Ohio St. i. If the latter position is correct, how- ever, it is difficult to support the principal case ; for only a portion of the easement and tracks were declared transferred, without any property to which they might be regarded as annexed. Nor is the decision supported by the cited authority. In 7'enn. Ry. v. E. Ala. Ry., 75 Ala. 516, it is decided that a railway company may bring ejectment for their easement ; while Hooper v. Ry., 78 Ala. 213, decides that railroads may he ejected from land. There is, moreover, a common objection that no railway corporation may be deprived of the property by which it is to serve the public. Plymouth Ry. v. Colwell, 39 Pa. St. 337. State v. Rives, 5 Ired. 297, contra. Corporations — Ultra Vires Lease — Recovery of Rent. — Where a corpo- ration made an ultra vires lease, held that the amount of the rent that accrued while the lessee was in actual possession may be recovered from a surety on a bond conditioned for performance of the covenants of the lease. Bath Gaslight Co. v. Claffy, 45 N. E. Rep. 390 (N. Y.). See Notes. Criminal Law — Homicide — Self-Defence — Duty to Retreat. — Held, a person who is unlawfully attacked by another may stand his ground, and use such force as at the time reasonably appears to him to be necessary to protect himself. State v. Hatch, 46 Pac. Rep. 708 (Kan.). This is true up to a certain point. Doubtless a person who is unlawfully assaulted may stand his ground and meet force with force, so long as there is no question of ex- treme violence or taking life. But where there is a state of facts such that the person attacked has the alternative of retreating or of killing his assailant, there seems no doubt that he ought to retreat. He should take his assailant's life only when, in his opinion, as a reasonable man, that is the only means of saving his own. 9 Harvard Law Review, 214; State v. Donnelly, 69 Iowa, 705. The Kansas court, on the con- trary, expressly repudiates this view, and lays down the dangerous principle that one unlawfully attacked need never retreat, but may meet force with force to the last extreme. Equity — Injunction — Public Nuisance. — The State authorities applied for an injunction against the keeper of a common gambling-house. Held, that, though a common gambling-house is a public nuisance, the court would not issue an injunction unless irreparable injury is threatened to property or civil rights, which is not shown here. State v. Patterson, tj S. W. Rep. 478 (Tex.). See Notes. Equity — Judgment Creditor's Bill. — Held, that equity will not entertain juris- diction of a bill by a judgment creditor, seeking to subject a widow's right of dower, before assignment to her, to the payment of the judgment debt. Harper v. Clayton, 35 Atl. Rep. 1083 (Md.). Though there is not much authority on this point, the weight of opinion seems to be that equity will aid judgment creditors to reach the right of dower of the widow
