- RECENT CASES. 6l
of authority, the opposite doctrine prevailing, though much regret is expressed that it should be law. Ujigley v. Unglty, L. R. 4 Ch. D. 73; Browne on the Statute of Frauds (4th ed.), § 459. This case is one of first impression in Missouri, and is a step in the right direction. Corporations — Attempt at Incorporation — Participants liable as Part- ners. — Action against the defendants as partners on a note signed by the Florida &c. Co. The defence was that the defendants were not a partnership, but a corporation organized under the laws of Tennessee. Held, that though on the facts the defendants are not a corporation de jure, de facto, nor by estoppel, they are liable as partners. Duke V. Taylor et al., 19 So. Rep. 172 (Fla.). It is well established that the individual members of such an association are liable in some form of contract action. But is a partnership the necessary legal consequence of an attempt like this at incorporation } It certainly is not. The participants may be liable as joint principals on the ordinary principles of contracts and agency, and it was so held in Joknson v. Corser, 34 Minn. 355, and the recent case of Roberts Mfg. Co. v. Schlick, 64 N. W. Rep. 826 (Minn.). It might be a matter of great practical importance whether defendants are liable as partners or not ; for instance, if the association should become bankrupt, the bankruptcy rule of firm assets to firm creditors and separate to separate would apply should the defendants be treated as a partnership. In accord with the principal case, see Martin v. Fewell, 79 Mo. 401, and Farnum v. Patch, 60 N. H. 294, 324-330- Corporations — " Companies Act " — Colorable Shareholders. — Action against two, promoters and shareholders of a corporation, on debt due from corporation for services. There were seven shareholders, the minimum required by the " Companies Act," none of whom held more than one £ share except the two defendants, who owned about ;^3,ooo. Held, that an action does not lie directly ; at least, corporation must cer- tainly be joined. Broderip v. Salomon, [1895] 2 Ch, D. 323, distinguished; MunkUirick V. Ferryman, 12 The Times L. R. 232. See Notes. Criminal Law — Fugitive from Justice — Interstate Rendition. — Defend- ant was extradited from Illinois for an act of burglary, and was committed for trial. Later, the prisoner was arraigned and convicted on an information for another and dif- ferent charge of burglary. Held, that notwithstanding his objections, a prisoner may be prosecuted for any indictable offence committed within the borders of a State, without first having had an opportunity to return to the State by which he has been surrendered. In re Petry, 66 N. W. Rep. 308 (Neb.). This point is fully discussed in the important case of Lascelles v, Georgia, 148 U. S. 537. It is there held that fugitives from justice have in another State no right of asylum in the international sense. If, as is generally admitted, a fugitive from justice may be kidnapped or unlawfully abducted from the State of refuge, and be thereafter tried in the State to which he is forcibly carried without violating any immunity se- cured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States {Mahon s. Justice, 127 U. S. 700), it is difficult to understand upon what sound principle can be rested the denial of a State's authority or jurisdiction to try him for another and different offence from that for which he was surrendered. The conflict of authority on this point has arisen from a failure to distinguish the rule regarding international extradition laid down in U. S. v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407, from interstate rendition. Criminal Law — Larceny — Continuing Trespass. — Held, that one stealing goods in Canada and bringing same into Vermont is guilty of larceny in Vermont, on the ground that the legal possession of the property remains in the true owner, and, the taking being felonious, that every asportation is a fresh taking. State v. Morrill, 33 Atl. Rep. 1870 (Vt.). The anomalous doctrine of continuing trespass, by which one who had stolen goods in one county in England was held to have committed larceny in every county into which he took the stolen goods, was not extended to cover the case of one who stole goods in a foreign country and brought them into England. Regina v. Anderson, 2 East P. C. 772; Rex V. Proxoes, I Moody C. C. 349. The principal case, following an earlier Vermont case {Sfate v. Bartlett, ii Vt. 650), makes this logical extension of the anomalous doctrine. The weight of authority is against the principal case, even in jurisdictions adopting the anomaly as regards stolen goods brought from another State. Stanliy v. State, 24 Ohio St. 166. In this connection, it is interesting to note that in a recent Massachusetts case not yet in the reports {Commonwealth v. Parker), a divided court (four against three) held that one who embezzled property in another State, and brought the embezzled property into Massachusetts, could be punished in Massachu- setts for embezzlement.
