140 HARVARD LAW REVIEW, modern tendency of the law is to allow freedom of contract in business transactions. If the buyer of a good-will requires unlimited space for the reasonable protection of what he has purchased, it is a sensible doctrine that the public is not injured if the seller is obliged to perform a contract which he has deliberately made and for which he has received adequate compensation. See 4 Harv. Law Rev. 128. Criminal Law — Compounding a Misdemeanor. — The defendant was indicted for receiving money in return for a promise not to prosecute an offender against the liquor statutes. Held, that this is an indictable offence. State v. Carver, 39 Atl. Rep. 973(N.H.). Some confusion has existed on the question as to what misdemeanors the common law allowed to be compounded. It has been said that the composition of any misde- meanor, unless allowed by statute, is illegal. Partridge v. Hood, 120 Mass. 403. The English decisions, although not entirely consistent, do not support so broad a rule. Fallowes v. Taylor, 7 T. R. 475; Kier v. Leeman, 9 Q. B. 371. The court in the prin- cipal case appears to take the proper distinction. If the misdemeanor is of a very low grade, or if it is essentially in the nature of a private injury, its composition is of too little importance for the law to notice. However, if the offence is of a public nature, the public is sufficiently interested in the punishment of the offender to make the compounding indictable, i Bish., Cr. L., § 711; Geier y. Leeman, 109 Pa. St. 180. The principal case seems to have been correctly regarded as falling under the latter head. Damages — Parent and Child — Prospective Damages. — The two-year-old son of plaintiff was killed by the negligence of defendant. Held, that plaintiff can recover for his trouble and expense in caring for and burying the child, but cannot recover for prospective loss of services. Southern Ry. Co. v. Covenia, 2g S. E. Rep. 219 (Ga.). The case follows what seems to be the settled rule in Georgia that no recovery can be had for prospective services, at least unless the child is capable of rendering services at the time of its death. Allen v. Atlanta St. R. R. Co., 54 Ga. 503. New York and the majority of American courts hold that the parent is entitled to prospective damages although the child is too young to render service. Cuming v. Brooklyn City R. R. Co., 109 N. Y.95. The English decisions, on the other hand, overlook the parental relation entirely, and found an action for injury to a minor exclusively upon loss of service, and the parent has no action even for expenses incurred unless the child is old enough to render services. The New York rule would seem to be the true one, as the parent is entitled to the services of the child until his majority, and this should be taken into consideration in assessing damages. Equity — Assignment of a Chose in Action. — A non-negotiable chose in action was subject to an equity in favor of A, who was not one of the parties to the obligation. Held, that an assignee of the chose in action for value and without notice takes it discharged from the equity. Williams v. Donnely, y4 N. W. Rep. 601 (Neb.). The authorities are in hopeless conflict on the question. The decisions contra con- fuse defences available by a party to the obligation with equities attaching thereto in favor of an outsider. Ames v. Richardson, 29 Minn. 330. An assignee can have no greater rights against the promisor than his assignor had. However, an assignee secures a legal right to Ijring an action in the name of his assignor. 3 Harv. Law Rev. 340, 341. The assignor cannot interfere, the transfer being complete. There- fore if the assignee has acted in good faith, he should acquire the right discharged from all equities except those which the promisor may plead in defence. Starr v, Haskins, 26 N. J. Eq. 414. The same principle is illustrated by Dodds v. Hills, 2 Hem. & M. 424. There a trustee of stock gave a power of attorney to a bona fide purchaser to secure a transfer of the stock on the books of the company. It was held, notwith- standing the objection of the cestui que trust, that the transfer might be made by the purchaser. Equity — Equitable Mortgages. — A trust deed purported to convey land as security for indorsements to be made by the cestui que trust named therein. The name of the grantee, the trustee, was omitted from the deed. In reliance on the deed the cestui que trust made the indorsements and was charged on them. Held, that, although the deed is inoperative at law, it is enforceable by the cestui que trust as an equitable mortgage. Dtdany v. Willis, 29 S. E. Rep. 324 (Va.). The deed was invalid at law because of the omission of the name of the grantee. However, it was apparent on the face of the deed that the grantor intended that this specific piece of property should operate as security for the valuable consideration which was advanced by the cestui que trust. In such a case there is an equitable mort-
