RECENT CASES. 143 Pledge — Negotiable Paper. — A bank made a pledge of negotiable paper, which it agreed to hold as agent for the pledgee. There was no actual transfer of possession. HelJ, that the pledge is valid even as against creditors of the bank. Matt/tewsonv. Caldwell, 52 Pac. Rep. 104 (Kan., Sup. Ct). See No^es. Procedure — Verdicts — Separation of Jury. — By consent of the prisoner and prosecuting attorney and by direction of the court, the jury gave to their foreman a sealed verdict, and separated for several hours before returning this verdict. Held, that this is reversible error. State v. Mason, 52 Pac. Rep. 525 (Wash.). The practice as to the separation of jurors after sealing a verdict differs in this country. If such separation is by consent of parties or direction of the court, it is almost universally held unobjectionable in civil cases. In only a few jurisdictions is it allowable in criminal cases, under any circumstances. As a sealed verdict cannot be changed, and permission to .separate is conducive of promptness in the rendition of verdicts, it seems that such permission, in the discretion of the court, should be allowed in criminal cases. State v. Engles, 13 Ohio, 490 ; Sanders v. State, 2 Iowa, 230. Property — Chattel Mortgage — Rights of Assignee. — Agave a chattel mortgage to B, and later one on the same property to C, the latter agreeing with 1$ that B's mortgage should have priority. C, however, filed his first and immediately assigned it to D, a bona fide purchaser for value. Held, that B has a first lien as against D. David Stevenson Brewing Co. v. Iba, 49 N. E. Rep. 677 (N. Y.). The fact that this question arises in New York shows the persistent opposition of the legal profession to the New York doctrine as to latent equities, namely, that an assignee of a chose in action takes it subject not only to equities in favor of the obligor and subsequent parties, but also to those in favor of outsiders. The doctrine is wrong on principle, but seems firmly established in New York. Greene v. Warnick, 64 N. Y. 220. The principal case carries the application of it to an unfortunate extreme.- The court cites in support of its ruling Decker v. Boice, 83 N. Y. 215, but the passage referred to is only a dictum, and moreover is founded on the special provisions of the statute as to the recording of conveyances of real estate. Under any reasonable inter- pretation of the statute requiring the filing of chattel mortgages, B's mortgage, being unrecorded, would be wholly void as to D, and to give effect to the agreement between B and D is to provide a very easy method of evading the registry laws. Property — Common-Law Copyright. — Held, the distribution of a book among the public generally, or those who choose to subscribe for it under certain terms, though it is not sold but only let for a term under restrictions as to its use, amounts to such a publication as will deprive the author of his common-law right of literary property in its contents. Jewellers' Mercantile Agency v. Jewellers' Weekly Publishing Co., 49 N. E. Rep. 872 (N. Y.). Property — Deeds — Delivery — Trusts. — A deed sought to convey property to A on certain trusts. The deed was sealed and recorded, but there was no further evidence of delivery. The trustee never accepted the trust. Held, that the beneficiary cannot enforce the deed against the grantor or his representatives. Loring v. Hildreth, 49 N. E. Rep. 652 (Mass.). According to the settled law of Massachusetts, the fact of recording is not conclu- sive evidence of delivery. Maynard v. Maynard, 10 Mass. 456. Consequently, the deed was at law a nullity, and the grantor was never divested of his title. The case, therefore, was very properly treated as falling within the principle that equity will not compel a donor to complete an imperfect gift. If, however, the court had found a valid delivery, the trust should have been enforced against the grantor, notwithstanding the trustee s disclaimer. Adams v. Adams, 21 Wall. 185. The distinction is that where the deed is properly delivered, the title rests immediately in the trustee without accept- ance and even without his knowledge. A perfect trust having been thus created, it will not be allowed to fail even though the trustee by his disclaimer thrusts the title back on the grantor. Property — Equitable Conversion — Resulting Trusts. — Land was devised to X upon trust to sell and to divide the proceeds between testator's two children. One of the latter died during the lifetime of the testator. Held, that the lapsed share of the deceased child results to the heir of the testator and not to his next of kin. In re Rudy's Estate, 39 Atl. Rep. 968 (Pa.). The case is undoubtedly law, and is simply a reiteration of the doctrine of Ackroydv. Smithson, i Bro. C. C. 503. Ever since that leading case, it has been uniformly held that where the purposes of a conversion partially fail, the trust results to the heir or next of kin according to the nature of the property in its unconverted condition. 19
