Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 12.djvu/210

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HARVARD LAW REVIEW.
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I90 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. by and in the name of the firm, although Smith was alone sued and paid the entire judgment. Upon an assumpsit by Smith against Ayrault for contribution, the plaintiff recovered. In Van Diver v. Pollak,^ contribution was allowed between joint trespassers where their trespass consisted of levies made by their joint procurement under their several attachments, and was made in good faith, believing that the claim of the assignee to the prop- erty was actually fraudulent. To the same general effect see Farwell v. Becker.^ In Gulf, Colorado, & Santa F6 Ry. Co. v. Galveston, Harrisburg, & San Antonio Ry. Co.,^ the three companies had a yard used indiscriminately by all three, but belonging exclusively to the Gulf Company. A joint employee of the three companies in the yard was injured while coupling cars on an unballasted track, and sued jointly the Gulf Company and the Galveston Company, recovering a judgment which was paid half by the Gulf Company and half by the Galveston Company. The injury was found by the court to have been caused by the negligence of the Gulf Company and the Galveston Company. The court further found that the New York Company had not been guilty of any negligence. Upon these facts the Gulf Company sued the Galveston Com- pany for indemnity, and the New York Company for contribution, and the court held: — First, That as the Gulf Company had furnished an unballasted and unsafe track, it was guilty of the primary negligence, and cannot have indemnity against the Galveston Company. Second, That as the New York Company was found free from fault, it cannot be compelled to contribute. And Hobby, P. J., laid down the correct general rule as to con- tribution as follows: — " The rule is far from being universally true that there can be no con- tribution between wrongdoers. It prevails in that class of cases de- nominated as intentional torts or wrongs." In Palmer v. Wick & Pulteneytown Steam Shipping Company,* the appellant, a stevedore, was engaged in discharging iron from the respondent's ship, when one of his workmen was killed by the fall of a block, part of the ship's tackle. The tackle was de- 1 97 Ala. 467 ; s. c. 19 L. R. A. 628 {1893). 2 21 N. E. 792 (111., 1889). 8 83 Tex. 509 (1892). * L. R. (1894), H. L. (Sc.) A. C. 318.