220 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. impeach as voluntary a conveyance by him to the cestui. The cases are analogous in principle and should be decided alike. The authorities are collected in Ames, Cases on Trusts, 2d ed., 181. Statute of Limitations — Injunction against Pleading Statute. — Plain- tiff, an attorney, contracted with defendant to collect on commission certain bonds due the latter. Defendant later sold the bonds without notifying plaintiff, who did not learn of the sale until ten years afterward. Plaintiff then sued at law for breach of contract, and, on defendant setting up the Statute of Limitations, brings this bill in equity to enjoin the pleading of the statute. Held, that plaintiff is entitled to the relief asked. Halloway v. Appelget, 40 Atl. Rep. 27 (N. J., C. A.). There is no doubt that there was equity in the plaintiff's bill. Although the ma- jority of the cases in which a defendant has not been allowed to plead the Statute of Limitations have been those in which the act giving rise to the action was itself fraudu- lent, there is no reason why equity should not interfere on the same principle when the defendant by his fraud, after the right of action accrues, aims directly at obtaining an unfair advantage by reason of the statute. Rolfe v. Gregory, 34 L. J. Ch. n. s. 274. It is more doubtful whether the relief afforded was the right relief. By enjoining the defendant from setting up his defence, and then letting the case go from its own con- trol, the Court of Chancery obtained no assurance that the plaintiff himself would do equity. It would seem that the plaintiff should have filed his bill for relief upon the original contract, asking the Court of ICquity to take complete control over the case. The court could then, in its own discretion, have forbidden the defendant to set up the statute, and at the same time could have prevented the plaintiff from making an inequitable use of his advantage. Aston v. Lord Exeter, 6 Ves. Jr. rt, 288; Hylton v. Morgan, 6 Ves. Jr. 293. It is to be noted, however, that in England, and in most jurisdictions where law and equity are administered in the same courts, the plaintiff could have gained his point by an equitable replication. Gibbs v. Guild, ?> Q. B. D. 296; 9 Q. B. D. 59. Torts — Homicide — Year and Day Rule. — The plaintiff brought a statutory action to recover damages for her husband's death, which resulted from injuries caused by the defendants. Held, that recovery is not barred because death occurred more than a year and a day after the injuries were inflicted. Western &' Atl. R. R. Co. V. Bass, 30 S, E. Rep. 874 (Ga.). The case is interesting because the point has seldom been raised. The decision doubtless presents the correct view. The year and a day rule is an arbitrary rule of criminal law founded on grounds of public policy, and it should have no application in civil cases, where the only question is whether the defendant's act is the proximate cause of the death for which an action is brought. Louisville &' St. L. R. R. v. Clarke, 152 U. S. 230; Schlichting v. Wintgen, 25 Hun, 626 (N. Y.). Torts — Invasion of Privacy. — The defendant in an advertisement of his medicine published of the plaintiff with substantial truth but without authorization : " Dr. Morgan Dockrell is prescribing Sallyco; he says nothing has done his gout so much good." Held, that plaintiff has no cause of action. Dockrell v. Dougall, 78 L. T. R. 840, See Notes. Torts — Negligence — Intervention of a Third Party. — The plaintiff was injured by a trunk being thrown against him during a struggle between public porters over baggage left in an insecure position by a servant of the defendant. Held, that the negligence of the defendant's servant was not the direct and proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. Murphy v. Great Northern Railway Co., [1897] 2 I. R. 301. The case is on the border line, but is correctly decided if the result could not have reasonably been foreseen by the original wrongdoer, — a point upon which the judges touch but lightly. The general rule is that the intervention of a malicious and inten- tional act of a third party reheves the original wrongdoer of any liability for the results of his negligence. Alexander v. Town of New Castle, 115 Ind. 51. The mere negligence of an intervening third party, howevc", does not necessarily break the causal connection between the injury and the original act, especially if, under the circumstances, the intervening negligent act ought to have been anticipated. Lane v. Atlantic Works, III Mass. 136. The present case seems to have been put on the ground that the acts of the porters were acts of " affirmative misconduct "and not of mere negligence. It is questionable whether the majority of courts in this country would follow this case when the misconduct of the third person ought to have been foreseen. Torts — Negligence — Landowner's Lfability to Children. — Held, that a railroad company is not liable for an injury by a turn-table to an infant trespasser. Delaware, etc. R. R. v. Reich, 40 Atl. Rep. 682 (N. J., C. A.). See Notes.
