RECENT CASES. 283 applied for mandamus to the former town officers, ordering them to resume their func- tions. Held, that the application be denied. State v. Mayor, etc. of Town 0/ Dover, 41 Atl. Rep. 98 (N. J., Sup. Ct.). The case shows the tendency of most courts to extend the doctrine of de facto corporations. It was recently decided in New Jersey that, though the statute under which a public corporation is organized be unconstitutional, its existence de facto cannot be questioned by a private individual. Coast Co. v. Sprins[ Lake, 36 Atl. Rep. 21 ; see also 10 Harv. Law Ricv. 452. The principal case goes further and holds that it can- not be questioned even by the State except on quo warranto proceedings directly against the supposed corporation or its officers. Mandamus to the de jure town officers could not issue until the de facto city officers had been actually ousted. See 2 Dillon, Munic. Corp., 4th ed., §§ 844, 894, 895. Persons — Parents' Right to recover for Injury to Minor Child. — A minor child, while serving a penal sentence which would have expired in a short time, and before its majority, was injured by the negligent act of defendant. Held, that the parent may recover for the loss of the child's services. Ames v. Atlanta Ry. Co., 31 S. E. Rep. 42 (Ga.). The case is interesting because there is very little authority upon the question. It is generally held in this country that a parent may recover for the loss of the services of a minor child, although at the time of the injury the child, with the consent of its parents, was engaged in the service of another. Blo^gs v. Ilscy, 127 Mass. 191. There seems to be a sufficient analogy between this class of cases and the principal case to lead to the same result. If, however, the child were imprisoned for a period which would not expire during its infancy, the parent could show no right to the services of the child, and a recovery should not be allowed. The case would then be similar to one in which the parent would be prevented from recovering for an injury to the child by reason of the fact that the child had been emancipated before the injury was sufifered. Tiffany, Persons, 269. Property — Chattel Mortgages — Consideration Illegal in Part. — Held, that a chattel mortgage given to secure two debts, one of which is illegal for usury, is not wholly void, but will stand as security for the valid debt. Atkinson v. Burt, 45 S. W. Rep. 987 (Ark.). It is well settled that securities for the performance of obligations which are wholly illegal are not binding at law, even when given subsequently to the illegal transaction. Fisher v. Bridf;es, 3 E. & B. 642 ; Paxton v. Popham, 9 East, 407. The doctrine of the principal case, though difficult to support on the authorities cited, has been adopted by some courts. Carradine v. Wilson, 61 Miss. 573. The weight of authority, however, seems to hold that even the partial illegality of a debt vitiates for all purposes a mort- gage given for its security. Brigham v. Potter, 14 Gray, 522 ; Williams v. Fitzhugh, 37 N. Y. 444. This view seems preferable, for the security has a distinctly illegal purpose if any part of the debt for which the security is given is tainted with illegality, and to hold an instrument binding as to its lawful purposes, but void as to its unlawful pur- poses, is at variance with the expressed intention of the parties. Property — Conveyances in Fraud of Creditors — Powers. — S., being in prosperous circumstances, with no intent to defraud either existing or subsequent cred- itors, made a voluntary conveyance of real estate in fee. On the next day, the grantee reconveyed to S., in trust for S. for life, with powers of aliening, leasing, mortgaging, or devising ; and, if not thus disposed of, remainder in trust for the two daughters of S. and their heirs. Held, that, although the deeds were duly recorded, they may be set aside by subsequent creditors. Scott v. Keane, 40 Atl. Rep. 1070 (Md.). A conveyance, valid as against existing creditors, can be avoided by subsequent creditors only when made with intent to defraud them. Kane v. Roberts, 40 Md. 590. Here, the transaction was admitted to be in good faith ; but nevertheless the ample powers reserved were held conclusive evidence of actual fraud. This, is, perhaps, going beyond the existing authorities ; but the decision, although possibly judicial legis- lation, is not unlikely to meet with approval. But another, and, it seems, an unten- able position was also taken. If the deed had been upheld, only the life estate would have been liable for the debts of S., who was yet practically owner of the property; and therefore the case was declared to fall within the rule which forbids a man, while retaining the benefits of ownership, to place his property beyond the reach of his creditors. In re Pearson, 3 Ch. D. 807 ; Brown v. McGill, 39 Atl. Rep. 613 (Md.). This reasoning confuses conveyances in fraud of creditors and provisions in restraint of alienation. Gray, Restraints on Alienation, 2d ed., § 91. In the one case the whole deed is void, but only as regards creditors ; in the other, the unlawful provisions are invalid as against all the world, but the remainder of the deed is unimpeachable. Z7
