RECENT CASES. 43 1 to what is the test to determine when a Court of Admiralty has jurisdiction. In the Mary Stewart, lo Fed. Rep. 137, and in a number of subsequent cases, it is said that the damage must have happened on water. In fact, neither the place where the damage occurs nor the place where the negligent omission of duty takes place determines the jurisdiction. It depends upon the place where the force which produces the damage is applied to the injured person. In certain cases, for example, where a person is thrown from a ship to a wharf, as in the principal case, either a common law or admiralty court may have jurisdiction, there having been two acts of injury, one upon the ship, an- other upon the wharf. The opinion in the principal case furnishes a safe guide for the determination of future cases. Agency — Master and Servant — Torts. — Plaintiff was injured through the negligent management of a carriage in which defendant was driving. Defendant owned the carriage, horses, and harness. The coachman was a regular employee of a livery stable keeper, who took care of the horses and carriage, and who furnished a driver whenever needed by defendant. Held, that a jury might reasonably find that the relation of master and servant existed between the defendant and the coachman at the time of the accident. Jones v. Scullard, [1898] 2 Q. B. D. 565. This decision recognizes the test adopted by the weight of authority in fixing the liability for the torts of a servant, namely, that he is responsible as master who had the authority to control the conduct of the servant in the work in which he was en- gaged at the time of the accident. Story, Agency, gth ed., § 453 (b) ; McGuire v. Grant, 29 N. J. Law, 356, 371; Sproul v. Hemingway, 14 Pick, i, 5. In the principal case, if the horses had belonged to the stable-keeper he would be responsible as master, and not the owner of the carriage. Quarman v. Burnett, 6 M. & W. 499. In that case the latter could not have given unreasonable orders as to the driving, as the driver would have been warranted in disobeying them in the interest of his own employer, the owner of the horses. As the facts were, the driver would have had no excuse for disobedience beyond a reasonable consideration for his own safety, and so was more completely under the control of defendant. See Donovan v. Daing, etc. Construction Co., [1893] I Q. B. D. 629. Carriers — Throwing Packages from Moving Trains. — A news agent threw a package of papers from defendant's train while it was passing through a small station, and the package struck and injured the plaintiff. The news agent was not a servant of the defendant, but it was customary to throw packages from the train. Held, that a nonsuit is not error. McGrath v. Eastern Ry. Co., "j-j N. W. Rep. 136 (Minn.). The plaintiff must show negligence on the part of the defendant, but even if the act is not done by a servant of the company, the courts hold it liable if the act is done in accordance with a dangerous custom known to the company. Galloway v. Chicago R. R. Co., 56 Minn. 346; Snow v. Fitchburg R. R. Co., 136 Mass. 552. The court in the principal case directed a nonsuit, on the ground that there was no evidence of negligence, since the custom was not dangerous. In a similar case, however, where a company allowed its employees to throw sticks of wood off the train at their various homes along the line, a nonsuit in the lower court was held to be error. Fletcher v. Baltimore &" P. R. R. Co., 168 U. S. 135. There is very little authority on the point, but since it is purely a question of fact it is hard to support the peremptory action taken by the court in the principal case, which seems very close to the line. Constitutional Law^ ^- Impairment of Contracts — Jurisdiction of Fed- eral Court. — By the Funding Act of 187 1, the State of Virginia agreed that coupons of certain bonds should be receivable for taxes. By reason of a later statute, forbidding the receipt of anything but legal tender for taxes, plaintiff was refused relief in a suit duly brought to obtain credit for coupons held by him. The ground of the decision was that the original agreement by the State was unconstitutional. Held, that the United States has authority to review this decision, since it appears by the record that effect was really given to the later statute. McCullough v. Virginia, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 134. See Notes. Constitutional Law — Interstate Commerce — Equal Protection of the Laws. — A New York statute imposed a tax on the "franchise or business" of all cor- porations and associations doing business in that State, with an exemption in favor of companies engaged wholly in manufacturing within the State. On a. writ of error to the New York Court of Appeals, it was held, that this statute does not deny the equal protection of the laws to a Michigan corporation doing business partly in New York, and does not amount to an unconstitutional regulation of interstate commerce. New York V. Roberts, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 58, 72. Harlan and Brown, JJ., dissenting.
