498 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. chattel without intending so to do. And this intention to abandon, shown by evidence, is what is material, and not mere absence of intention to remain in possession. Had the trespasser carried the chattels to some house and left them there, he would clearly not be guilty if he took them away a few days later. The mere fact, then, that the wrongdoer chose as his place of deposit the owner's own premises must be far from con- clusive of the latter's possession. Continuity of intention is clearly in such a case continuity of possession. In the absence of evidence of his intention to abandon, Richards, in the present case, should not have been convicted of stealing even if he had postponed for several days the removal of the fruits of his wrong. And had the facts so appeared, an upper court might have had the opportunity of clearing up this curious antinomy in the law of larceny. Gifts of Non-negotiable Instruments. — Sixty years ago the case of Edwards v. Jones, i Myl. & Cr. 226, decided, in effect, that one who gave to another a non-negotiable instrument, such as a bond, though a power of attorney to the donee were written upon it, had the legal right to release the obligation represented by the instrument, or to revoke the power of attorney, and that that power was necessarily revoked by his death. The question was treated as an equitable one, in some way con- nected with gratuitous declarations of trust and the various phases of Ex parte Pye, 18 Ves. 140. The case has been supposed to represent the English law to-day. It seems, however, that according to the better view the power of attorney granted would enable t4ie donee to sue on the instrument at law in the name of the donor, that, being written on and inseparable from the document, it was really a power incident to the greater thing, — the document, — so a power coupled with an interest, and so irrevocable. It is true the donor might at any time release the obligation and that release would make the power of attorney value- less, not by revoking it but by annihilating it. The act of releasing would be a direct infringement of the legal right of the donee, a tort ; a court of equity might well restrain the donor from committing it, or, if he had committed it, might force him to hold the proceeds of his wrong for the donee. This result, so eminently desirable, has almost always been reached in the American cases, — they have considered the transac- tion as an "equitable assignment which is in no way jevocable. Most inconsistently, the English courts have come to a like conclusion in regard to such a gift if delivered as a donatio mortis causa. Ames, cases on Trusts, page 139 note, page 145 note. The problem has been raised again in England by the recent case Re Griffin, 79 L. T. Rep. 442. A testator gave to his son a non-nego- tiable banker's receipt, — in effect a certificate of deposit, — indorsed " pay to my son " and signed. After his death the son, who was also his executor, received the deposit from the bank on his own account on presentation of the receipt. A bill was then filed against him by those entitled to the property of the testator for the amount of the deposit. According to the doctrine of Edwards v. Jones the power was revocable, and, as in the case of Edwards v. Jones, was revoked by the donor's death. After the death, then, the son held a receipt which he could not be compelled to give up but could not sue upon ; the estate of the tes- tator still held the obligation from the bank with power to release it, but
