5IO HARVARD LAW REVIEW. Property — Wills — Construction of Ambiguous Clause. — A testatrhc be- queathed five thousand dollars to A, and devised and bequeathed the residue of her estate to H. In a codicil she declared : "' I hereby revoke the bequest made by me to B, and give the five thousand dollars (heretofore in my will bequeathed to said B) to C." Held, that the codicil revoked the bequest to A. Home for Incurables . Noble, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 226. 1 he decision, which at first sight appears rather odd, rests upon satisfactory reason- ing. A mistake being apparent upon the face of the codicil, the court must construe the revoking clause so as to carry out the intention of the testatrix. An examination of the whole instrument leads to the conclusion that it could not have been the intention to revoke the residuary bequest to B. Hence the word " B " maybe stricken out. 2 Wil- liams Executors, 938. And there is suificient evidence upon the face of the will to justify the court in concluding that the revoking clause was intended to apply to the bequest to A. In the lower court a contrary decision was based upon the argument that the codicil contained two clauses separate from each other, a revocation free from ambiguity, and a bequest that could be rendered effective by disregarding the paren- thetical clause. But a conclusive answer to this view is that it disregards the settled rule of construction that the different clauses of a will should be considered in reference to each other. Lane v. Vick, 3 How. 464. Torts — Replevin — Attached Property. — In a suit against a debtor the sheriff attached goods of his which were exempt from attachment. Held, that the statute providing that where goods are taken under execution one, other than the de- fendant, claiming ownership, may replevy them, was remedial, and that this debtor could not replevy, his goods being /«(rMj/^fi!'/a/^^/j. Frescottv. Starkey, ^ Atl. 1021 (Vt.). The common-law rule that goods in ciistodia legis cannot be replevied has been laid down in its broadest extent. Kittredge v. Holt, 55 N. H. 621 ; Isley v. Stuhbs, 5 Mass. 280. The rule, however, is founded on grounds of public policy ; that to allow replevin would only lead to circuity and deprive the creditor of his security. It is clear that the reasoning does not hold when goods of a third party have been wrongfully seized in execution, and the better view seems to be that at common law such property might be replevied by the true owner. Winnardv. Foster, 2 Lutw. 1 191 ; Rooke's Case, 5 Coke, 99 ; Clark v. Skinnier, 20 Johns. 465. By parity of reasoning the replevy of goods exempt from attachment should be allowed, and such a view has been taken in some cases. Durch V. Rahner, 61 Ind. 64; Frazier v. Syas, 10 Neb. 115; Ross v. Hawthorne, 55 Miss. 551. The whole question has been largely dealt with by statute. Torts — Wilful Wrong — Avoidable Consequences. — The plaintiff was wrongfully riding on the footboard of defendant's engine. The engineer wilfully turned steam on him, whereupon he jumped to the next car, but slipped and was injured. Held, that since the act of the engineer was a wilful assault, the defendant is liable for the injury, irrespective of whether the plaintiff exercised ordinary care in jumping. Galveston, etc. Ry. Co. v. Zantzinger, 48 S. W. Rep. 563 (Tex. Sup. Ct.). The theory of the decision is that when the defendant's act is intentional and wilful it is the proximate cause, unless the plaintiff is guilty of wilful or gross negligence in failing to avoid the consequences thereof. Where the defendant's act is negligent the plaintiff is under a duty to use ordinary care to avoid the consequences. Hogle v. New York, etc. R. R. Co., 28 Hun, 363. Likewise, where the defendant's act is illegal. Flower V. Adam, 2 Taunt. 314. There is a tendency to h.)ld a defendant for more remote consequences when his act is intentional, but to relieve the plaintiff, in such a case, from all duty to exercise ordinary care is inconsistent with the doctrine of avoidable consequences. It seems, therefore, that it should have been left to the jury to deter- mine whether the plaintiff, in what he did, acted reasonably, or whether he was so de- prived of his presence of mind as to render his act irresponsible, Jones v. Boyce, i Stark, 493 ; Woolley v. Scovell, 3 Man. & Ry. 105. REVIEWS. Studies in International Law. By Thomas Erskine Hollan/J, D.C.L. Oxford : At the Clarendon Press. London and New York : Henry Froude. 1898. pp. viii, 314. This volume consists mainly of a number of lectures and addresses delivered by the author during the last twenty-five years. They discuss
