S60 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. direct the courts perhaps adopt an arbitrary way of reaching the result, for usually a vendor's lien only gives a right to have the property sold and the proceeds distributed. If, however, the value of the property is considerably less than the lien claim, the lienor can safely bid the prop- erty in for himself, as he will afterwards receive back all the purchase money. So when the father asks the court for a reconveyance, that relief is no more than a short cut to the proper result. Were the property much greater in value than the claim, a reconveyance would be hard to justify on the above principle, because of the son's right to the surplus. This question, however, has not yet come before the courts. In recent years the practice of granting some form of equitable relief on default by the son has become more common, and it now seems likely to find a permanent place in our law. It is to be hoped that soon its fundamental principles will be defined, and the doctrine placed on a sound basis. The Rights of a Beneficiary under a Contract. — In most American jurisdictions a beneficiary not a party to a contract may always sue ; in England and in some few of the United States such a beneficiary can never sue. In New York a beneficiary can sue by exception where lineal relationship exists between promisee and beneficiary. In New York also there is the rule of Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268 : when a promise looks to the satisfaction of a claim of a third party against the promisee such a quasi-beneficiary may sue. All of this law was involved in a recent decision of the New York Court of Appeals. The defendant entered into a contract with the husband of the plaintiff whereby the husband was to aid the defendant in overthrowing a clause of a will ; and in event of success the defendant was to pay the wife, the plaintiff, $50,000. The husband gave the required assistance ; the will was broken ; but the de- fendant refused to pay. Upon appeal, the court by a vote of four to three allowed the plaintiff to succeed. Buchanan v. Tilden, 52 N. E. Rep. 724. The majority insisted that the wife was within the exception of near relationship ; and further the majority seem to decide that the obligation of the husband to support the wife enabled her to sue. As to the first reason : that idea is to be traced to the decision in an ancient case that a child might sue upon a promise made to its father for its benefit. Dut- ton v. Poole, i Vent. 318. The proposition of that case, although over- ruled in England, has survived in New York. The further step now taken by the majority in assimilating the case of husband and wife to the case of parent and child would be a fair one if the doctrine of the exception had any basis in theory or in policy ; but such does not appear. So the court might well have refused to extend it. As to the second reason : the case did not come within the rule of Lawrence v. Fox, supra. The obligation of the husband to support the wife was not a claim upon which an action could be brought ; nor did the promise look to the discharge of that obligation. Durnherr v. Rau, 135 N. Y. 219. Now upon any modern conception of a promise and of a contract the one to whom the promise is made and from whom the consideration moves has alone the legal right to sue. And yet the rule allowing a beneficiary to sue reaches a most just result. In such case one looks to equity. In equity the rights of most beneficiaries are seen to be recognized and en- forced. Why not of these beneficiaries? And if the beneficiary were allowed a bill for the specific performance of the promise in his behalf
