52 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. brated case of Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, it was decided that at least after the statute 8 Anne, c. 19, which gave the author a copyright for a limited term of years, the effect of publication was to deprive him of this common-law copyright. The doctrine of this case has always been received with favor in America. The question as to what constitutes publication, however, still remains unsettled in many respects, as is shown by a recent case in the New York Court of Appeals. Jewelers' Mercantile Agency v. Jewelers' Weekly J ublishing Co. (reported in the New York Law Journal, March 16). In this case the plaintiffs collected information con- cerning the jewelry trade, and printed it in books, which they distributed by lending them to all those who chose to subscribe for them under certain conditions. These conditions were that the subscriber should only have the use of the book for one year, should return it to the plaintiff at the end of that period, and should keep all information contained in it confi- dential. The defendants subscribed for the book and then published a part of its contents. The plaintiffs thereupon seek an injunctioi against such a publication as an infringement of their common-law copyright. The plaintiffs had taken steps to secure a copyright under the United States statute, and had already deposited two copies, as required by law, in the office of the Librarian of Congress. Three out of seven judges consider that this deposit amounted to a publication of the book, whether or not the copy- right under the statute was finally secured. As the deposit of the copies in the library made their contents accessible to the public, free at least from any control by the author, this view seems correct, and is a sufficient ground for the decision of the case in favor of the defendant. The result is reached by the majority of the court, however, by a different course of reasoning. They say that the distribution of copies of this, book, whether by way of sale or loan, without any limit except the willingness of the public to subscribe for it under the terms offered, amounted in substance to a publication ; .and to recognize the common-law right of property as still existing offers an «asy means by which the owners of :&. book may enjoy the profits of publication without giving up their perpetual exclusive rights in the work. It would seem, nevertheless, that the distribution in this case, however extensive it may have been, differed essentially from publication by putting on sale ; the book was never intended to circulate at all ; it was to be used only by those who took it directly from the pro- prietor and under his control. And if the owner of a piece of literary property can by any such scheme make a profit out of it, without clearly giving up his common-law copyright, there seems to be little reason for preventing him from doing so. It is hard enough for an author, in ordi- nary case of publication, to be compelled to exchange his perpetual unlim- ited right for a limited statutory right before he can make use of almost his only means of getting any advantage from the result of his labor. Substantive Law under the Guise ok Evidence. — The ordinary party to an action, if he feels that justice has been done, especially if it inclines to his side, generally accepts the final decision as being the sole matter of interest to him. It is not so with the judicial mind, to which the correctness of the result is of no greater interest than the principles on which that result rests. A decision recently handed down by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Richmond 6- Allegha?iy jR. H.
