56 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. this ancient rule governs. Cahin^s Case, 7 Rep. i. Whatever abstract rules there may be, the right of every sovereignty to determine for itself by its own laws who are its citizens is a fundamental one. By the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution "all persons born or naturalized within the United States are citizens ; " the exception is that those not born "subject to jurisdiction thereof" are not citizens. Are the children of aliens within the exception? When within our terri- tory, the sovereigns, diplomats, sailors upon ships of war, and soldiers in the organized military forces of a foreign State, are not subject to our jurisdiction. Children born of parents under these circumstances of extra-territoriality would not be citizens. The same is true of the chil- dren of tribal Indians. The logic of these exceptions of sovereignty, however, does not apply to the alien subject domiciled in the United States. He is subject to the territorial jurisdiction ; his children are born subject to our jurisdiction ; and these, by our municipal law, are citizens. Accordingly, the decision reached by the Supreme Court seems to have every sanction of authority, policy, and theory. The case further presents a phase of the conflict of laws not often considered. The objection to the doctrine of the majority opinion has been taken by very high authorities, that as our law provides no right of election by or for a child, as do the continental codes, a dual allegiance will result, and this is urged to be contrary to the theory of citizenship. This difficulty, however, is apparent rather than real. When a child is born in America of Chinese parents, China claims him by .q Jus sanguinis, America by the Jus soli. It is not a question whether he is an Ameri- can or a Chinaman ; he is both. The municipal laws being thus in conflict, his citizenship at any time will depend upon whether he is subject to the jurisdiction of the one or of the other country. The duality of citizenship is a fact only in a third country. In China he is a Chinaman ; in America, an American. Estoppel in Criminal Law. — Whether the doctrine of estoppel has any place in criminal law, and if so, what principles govern its application, are questions that have seldom, till of late years, come up for legal dis- cussion. The doctrine has been applied in some jurisdictions in cases of embezzlement under statute, and the decisions have been founded prin- cipally on the grounds put forward in Bishop on Criminal Law, Vol. IL ch. 16, § 364. (See, for example, State v. Spau/ditig, 24 Kan. i.) Rely- ing on such eminent authority, a dissenting judge in a recent Nebraska case maintained that the defendant should be estopped to set up a de- fence to the crime imputed to him. Moore y. State, 74 N. W. Rep. 319 (Neb.). The defendant, who was auditor of public accounts in the State, was indicted for embezzling some of the State's funds. The statute under which he was indicted enacted that if any person charged with the collection, safe-keeping, or disbursement of the public money convert any part of it to his own use, he shall be deemed guilty of embezzlement. By the constitution of the State all fees which were theretofore payable to a public officer for his services were made payable in advance into the State treasury. The defendant, pretending that he was charged with the collection of fees for the State, had received such fees from insurance com- panies, and had not accounted for them. The majority of the court held
