62 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. beyond its terminus assumes an obligation for their safe carriage to that point unless otherwise provided by a written contract signed by the shipper. (Code Va. [1887], §1295.) A'i?/*/, that this statute as applied to interstate commerce is not void under the Federal Constitution, but is merely a rule of evidence. Richmoitd cSr* A. R. Co. v. R. A. Patterson Tobacco Co., 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 335. See Notes. Constitutional Law — Taxation — Forkign-held Mortgages. — In Oregon, where the legal title to land mortgaged does not pass to the mortgagee, a statute pro- vided that the interest of the mortgagee be taxed, and that the amount so taxed be de- ducted from the assessment of the mortgagor. Held, that the statute is constitutional. Savings &^ Loan Soc. v. Multnomah County, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 392. The court relies squarely upon the ground that the lien of the mortgagee is an inter- est in the land and not a mere chose in action. A chose in action, such as the debt for which the mortgage is security, is taxable only at the domicile of the creditor. State lax on Foreign Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300. But an interest in land is taxable wherever the land is situated. The principal case is important in limiting the broad doctrine laid down by Field, J., in State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, supra. Contracts — Anticipatory Breach. — Held, that where one party to a contract gives notice of his intention not to carry out his contract, the other party may treat this as an anticipatory breach, and sue for damages before the time for performance arrives. Horst V. Roehm, 84 Fed. Rep. 565 (Fa., Cir. Ct.). The case follows Hochster v. De La Tour, 2 E. & B. 678, and is interesting from the fact that the question of anticipatory breach has seldom been adjudicated in this country. The only .State which has adopted the English view is Iowa, while Massachu- setts and Nebraska have refused to follow it. McCormick v. Basal, 46 Iowa, 236; Dayiiels v. Netvton, 114 Mass. 530; Carston v. McDonald, 38 Neb. 857. In the United States Supreme Court the question was expressly left open. Dingley v. Oler, 117 U. S. 490. The criticism of the doctrine of anticipatory breach in Daniels v. Newton, supra, appears sound, but it is possible that in courts where the question has not yet been decided certain grounds of convenience may prevail over the objections on prin- ciple, and an action for breach of contract be allowed before the time for performance has arrived. Contracts — Stranger to the Consideration. — Defendant made a contract with an employee to furnish him with medical attendance in case of accident. The employee was injured, and plaintiff, a physician, attended him. Held, that defendant is not liable to jjlaintiff for the services rendered. Thomas MfV. Co. v. Fraiher,A± S. W. Rep. 218 (Ark.). The majority of American jurisdictions, including Arkansas, hold that a sole benefi- ciary of a contract, though a stranger to the co-. sideration, may sue the promisor. Chamhlee v. AIcKenzie, 31 Ark. 155. The principal case, however, refuses to allow the beneficiary to sue at law, when the contract looks to the satisfaction of a valuable claim which he has against the promisee. Public policy may demand that a sole bene- ficiary be given a remedy directly, against the promisor, as otherwise he is without relief; but it is difficult to support an action at law on the principles of contract. In any event there is no such public policy in the principal case, and the decision therefore seems sound, although contrary to Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268, and the great weight of American authority. See 11 Harv. Law Rev. 415. Criminal Law — Doctrine of Estoppel. — Defendant, a public officer, was in- dicted for embezzlement under a statute enacting that if any one charged with the receipt or safe-keeping of the money of the State convert any part of the same to his own use, he shall be guilty of embezzlement. Defendant collected some fees from insurance companies, which were by law made payable in advance into the State treasury, and converted them to his own use. Held, that defendant is not within the description of the statute, and is not estopped to deny that the fees were the money of the State. Moore v. State, 74 N. W. Rep. 319 (Neb.). See Notes. Equity — Priority — Estoppel. — The second of two equitable mortgagees took his mortgage, believing the property unincumbered. This belief was caused by the mortgagor's possession of the title deeds, which had been left in his hands by the prior mortgagee. Held, that the prior mortgagee is precluded from asserting priority. In re Casfell &-» Broivn, [1898] i Ch. 315. Although as between two equitable claimants against the same person for the same thing the prior prevails, Tyler . IVM,6 Beav. 552, yet he may lose his advantage by his words or conduct. The possession of title deeds leads to a reasonable belief that the holder is the owner of unincumbered property. The second claimant acted on such a
