RECENT CASES. 6$ the intention of the testator. The harshness of the rule, which influenced the decision in the principal case, while it may be a good reason for its abolition, furnishes no ex- cuse for construing it into something which it is not. See ii Harv. Law Rf.v. 418. Property — Separate Use — Restraints on Alienation. — A woman in con- templation of marriage conveyed all her property to a trustee in trust for herself for life, for her separate use, without power of anticipation. After her marriage, she bor- rowed money from plaintiff, expressly charging her separate estate. Held, that the income is liable in the hands of the trustee for the satisfaction of plaintiff's claim. Brown v. McGiU, 39 Atl. Rep. 613 (Md.). See Notes. Quasi Contracts — Quantum Meruit. — A statute provided that convicts should not be required to labor on certain holidays. The defendant, a lessee of convict labor, compelled the plaintiff, a convict, to work ou the prescribed days. Held, that the plain- tiff cannot recover in an action of contract the value of such labor. Sloss Iron &' Steel Co. V. Harvey, 22 So. Rep. 994 (Ala.) Apparently the court failed to recognize the distinction between a contract implied in fact and a duty to pay which the law will raise when one person is unjustly enriched at the expense of another. Such a duty may be enforced in a contractual form of action, and seems clearly to have arisen in the principal case. The court admit the plaintiff's right to damages in trespass.^ It appears that he should have been permitted to waive this right and to recover in contract the value of the benefit received by the defendant. Patterson v. Prior, 18 Ind. 440. Sales — Contract of Exchange — St.vfute of Frauds. — On Saturday, the plaintiff and defendant verbally agreed to exchange horses. The defendant received the plaintiff's horse on Sunday, and the next day, repudiating the bargain, he returned him to the plaintiff. In an action of replevin, ^f/^, that the contract of exchange was within the Statute of Frauds, and that the statute was not satisfied by the receipt of the horse on Sunday. As/i v. AldrUh, 39 Atl Rep. 442 (N. H.). Contracts of exchange are not contracts of sale, and, as an original question, it is very doubtful whether the former should be held to be within the Statute of Frauds. However, courts have so often assumed them to be, without discussion, that the prin- cipal case would probably be generally followed on this point. Browne, Statute of Frauds, 5th ed., § 293. The decision of the court upon the other point presented is open to some doubt. The New Hampshire statute declares that no contract shall be valid unless the statute has been complied with. In other jurisdictions, with similar statutes, it is the settled construction that the Statute of Frauds presupposes a com- pleted legal contract, and the requirements of the statute must be fulfilled simply as a prerequisite of bringing an action. Amsinck v. American Ins. Co., 129 Mass. 185; Aladdison v. Alderson, 8 App. Cas. 467. Under such a construction, a verbal contract made on Sunday would be unenforceable, although the statute was satisfied on a week- day. It would seem to follow that the time of satisfying the statute is of no import- ance, and if the contract was not made on Sunday it should be enforced. Browne, Statute of Frauds, 5th ed., § 138 b. Sales — Estoppel — Conditional Delivery. — The plaintiff sold goods to D* part payment to be made in cash. The goods were shipped and delivered without the cash payment. The plaintiff knew D was a tradesman and would put the goods on sale. D sold to the defendant and the plaintiff replevied them, claiming title. Held, the plaintiff is estopped to deny that he parted with his title. Lrwenberg v. Hayes, 39 Atl. Rep. 469 (Me.). It was apparently the theory of the court that the plaintiff intended to retain title to the goods, since part payment was to be made in cash. Such a doctrine is often ap- plied to small transactions. Bussey v. Barnett, 9 M. & W. 312. In commercial trans- actions, however, when goods are ordered to be shipped, the title presumably passes on shipment. Longv. Fragano, 4 B. & C. 219. In the principal case, the stipulation for cash payment would hardly show a different intention, but would merely indicate that the plaintiff retained a lien on the goods. His voluntary delivery to D would ter- minate that lien and D's title would become perfect. Hoskins v. Warren, 115 Mass. 515. Assuming, however, that D had no title, the defendant's right to the goods was unimpeachable, without invoking the doctrine of estoppel. The plaintiff, by intrusting his goods to one whom he knew would sell them, impliedly authorized a sale, and the defendant, being a bona fide purchaser, would acquire a good title. Spoorur v. Cum- tnings, 151 Mass. 313. Sales — Rescission by Seller — Tender of Partial Payment. — The plain- tiff, induced by fraud, sold goods to the defendant. The defendant made a payment oa accoimt and then sold part of the goods to a bona fide purchaser. Held, that the 9
