Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 2.djvu/233

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EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY
215

employees of railroads could recover, if without negligence themselves, when the injury was caused by the act of a co-employee. This statute was incorporated into the successive codes. The provisions of the present code relating to employers' liability are the following:[1]

§ 2083. "Railroad companies are common carriers and liable as such. As such companies necessarily have many employees who cannot possibly control those who should exercise care and diligence in the running of trains, such companies shall be liable to such employees as to passengers for injuries arising from the want of such care and diligence."

§ 3036. "If the person injured is himself an employee of the [railroad] company, and the damage was caused by another employee and without fault or negligence on the part of the person injured, his employment by the company shall be no bar to the recovery."

This exception to the common-law doctrine, however, is confined strictly to railroads, as § 2202 enacts that "the principal is not liable to one agent for injuries arising from the negligence or misconduct of other agents about the same business. The exception in the case of railroads has been previously stated."

How far these different sections modified one another, it became necessary for the courts to decide. In Thompson v. Central Railroad and Banking Company, 54 Ga. 509, the plaintiff, a switchman, was injured by the dropping of a bar of iron on his shoulder by the carelessness of some laborers engaged in carrying the iron across the defendant's yard. The court below granted a nonsuit, on the ground that the road was not liable to an employee for injuries received from co-employeds, unless connected with the running of trains. To this ruling the plaintiff excepted, and the question before the court was, whether in a case not connected with the running of trains the road was liable. In a previous case,[2] the court thought there might be doubt "whether the section embraces any injuries but such as are sustained from the running of the cars or engine." The court here, however, held the company liable, reversing the judgment. This construction has been repeatedly followed and recognized. Jn Georgia Railroad and Banking Company v, Goldwire, 56 Ga. 196, the court said that these provisions "declare in unmistakable


  1. Code Ga,, 1873.
  2. Henderson v. Walker, 55 Ga. 481. This case was decided before, though reported after, Thompton's case. Vide Georgia Railroad v. Ivey, 73 Ga., 499, 503.