her consent to the commutation. In 1876, under the advice of counsel, who thought themselves astute, she refused to consent to the commutation, and sued out a writ of habeas corpus but with a very different result from that which she or her counsel anticipated. Judge Bingham, of the Franklin Common Pleas (now Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia), held that her consent was necessary to commutation, and that the imprisonment in the penitentiary was illegal, but that the result of these conclusions was, not that she should be discharged, but that she should be remanded to the sheriff for execution. From this she and her counsel took a writ of error to the Supreme Court, who held (31 Ohio St 206) that her acceptance was not necessary to commutation. She was remanded to the penitentiary, and there remained until pardoned last year.
"Another curious question has arisen and been decided in Ohio upon the law of pardons, to wit, that an unconditional pardon is irrevocable although procured by fraud. (Knapp v. Thomas, 39 Ohio St. 377.)
"Oddly enough, although in this case Governor Foster attempted to revoke the pardon of the prisoner, who was recaptured and again imprisoned until discharged by habeas corpus issued in the case cited, the prisoner finally died from the consequences of the fraud itself, which consisted in eating soap to create emaciation, and give the idea that he was a dying man, upon which theory the pardon was granted.
"If you care to follow the subject of Ohio paroles further you will find, perhaps, some additional information in a pamphlet,[1] which I enclose herewith, being a copy of an address on the subject of pardons and commutations delivered by myself at the National Conference of Charities and Corrections, St. Paul, Minnesota, in July, 1886.
"Yours truly,
"GEO. HOADLY."
THE LAW SCHOOL.
LECTURE NOTE.
Slander.—Conditional Privilege. — (From Mr, Schofield's Lectures.) — A person making a false statement in good faith is protected when the communication has been made in the discharge of a duty, public or private, legal or moral, or in the conduct of his own business, in matters where his interest is concerned. To accuse a servant of misconduct, though in the presence of third parties,[2] to warn one's servants to avoid a person lately discharged from service,[3] are excusable acts, because done in the conduct of one's affairs; while to give information when requested, or to volunteer it to protect a friend, is only to discharge a social duty.
Where the communication, being made solely in the interest of the person receiving it, has been volunteered, and no confidential relation existed at the time, the courts are inclined to say that, if made in good faith, in the absence of ofHciousness, the occasion was privileged. (Adcock V. Marsh, 8 Iredell, 369; Odgens, S. & L., 2d ed., 213.)
