Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 2.djvu/27

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THE HISTORY OF ASSUMPSIT.
9

originally essential to the actions against surgeons or carpenters, and bailees. The parallel between these actions and the action on a warranty holds true on this point also. A case in the Book of Assises is commonly cited, it is true, to show that from very early times one who sold goods, knowing that he had no title to them, was liable in an action on the case for deceit.[1] This may have been the law.[2] But, this possible exception apart, a vendor was not answerable to the vendee for any defect of title or quality in the chattels sold, unless he had either given an express warranty, or was under a public duty, from the nature of his calling, to sell articles of a certain quality. A taverner or vintner was bound as such to sell wholesome food and drink.[3] Their position was analogous to that of the smith, common carrier, and innkeeper.

The necessity of an express warranty of quality in all other cases is illustrated by the familiar case of Chandelor v. Lopus[4] (1606–1607). The count alleged that the defendant sold to the defendant a stone, affirming it to be a bezoar stone, whereas it was not a bezoar stone. The judgment of the King’s Bench, that the count was bad, was affirmed in the Exchequer Chamber, all the justices and barons (except Anderson, C. J.) holding “that the bare affirmation that it was a bezoar stone, without warranting it to be so, is no cause of action; and although he knew it to be no bezoar stone, it is not material; for every one in selling his wares will affirm that his wares are good, or that his horse is sound; yet, if he does not warrant them to be so, it is no cause of action.” The same doctrine is repeated in Bailie v. Merrill.[5] The case of Chandelor v. Lopus has recently found an able defender in the pages of this Review. In the number for November, 1887, Mr. R. C. McMurtrie urges that the decision was a necessary consequence of the rule of pleading, that the pleader must state the legal effect of his evidence, and not the evidence itself. It is possible that the judgment would have been arrested in Chandelor v. Lopus, if it had come before an English court of the present century.[6] But it is


  1. 3 Y. B. 42, Lib. Ass. pl. 8.
  2. But see Kenrick v. Burges, Moore, 126, per Gawdy, J., and Roswell v. Vaughan, Cro. Jac. 196, per Tanfield, C. B.
  3. Y. B. 9 H. VI. 53, pl. 37; Keilw. 91, pl. 16; Roswell v. Vaughan, Cro. Jac. 196; Burnby v. Bollett, 16 M. & W. 644, 654.
  4. Dy. 75 a. n. (23); Cro. Jac. 4.
  5. 1 Roll. R. 275. See, also, Leakins v. Clizard, 1 Keb. 522, per Jones.
  6. But see Crosse v. Gardner, 3 Mod. 261, Comb. 142, s. c.; Medina v. Stoughton, 1 Ld. Ray. 593, 1 Salk. 210, s. c.