Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 32.djvu/178

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142
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
142

142 HARVARD LAW REVIEW becomes a firm and indefeasible title even against the former owner as of the date when the disseisin or adverse possession commenced.^^ Accordingly we must not confound the negative operation of the statute with the positive efifect of a conveyance of the title from the true owner to the adverse possessor at the moment the statute has fully nm. In Tichhorne v, Weir^^ it is held that when one holds adversely to a lessee for ninety-nine years, the adverse possessor cannot be treated as an assignee so as to render him liable on the covenants of the lease. It is sometimes said, indeed, that the law presumes a conveyance by the true owner on the grounds of public policy when the right of entry is gone.^^ But it is un- necessary to resort to the presumption or fiction of a conveyance.^" Adverse possession vests the possessor with the complete title as efi^ectually as if there had been a conveyance by the former owner .^^ But the title is independent, not derivative, and "relates back" to the inception of the adverse possession.^^ The adverse possessor does not derive his title from the former owner, but from a new source of title, his own possession. The "investitive fact" is the disseisin and exercise of possession.^ It is only in case of incorporeal rights that title is acquired by length of adverse user. Title is not gained by length of adverse possession under the statute, except as against the true owner. In case of rights of way and other easements when acquired by pre- scription, the adverse user under claim of title is also the "investi- " Re Atkinson & Horsell, [191 2] 2 Ch. i; Tichborne v. Weir, 67 L. T. 735 (1892); Perry v. Clissold [1907] A. C. 73; i Com. L. Rep. 363. Cf. La Salle v. Sanitary District, 260 111. 423, 429, 430, 103 N. E. 175 (1913). See Bryan v. Weems, 29 Ala. 423 (1856); Ames, Lectures on Legal Hist. 197-205; 3 Anglo-American Essays, 567; LiGHTwooD, Time Limit on Actions, 117, 156; Banning, Limitation of Actions, 84; I Dart, Vendors & Purch. 473; i Hayes, Introd. to Conv. 268. 2« 67 L. T. 735 (1892). 29 Cadwalader v. Price, in Md. 310, 73 Atl. 694 (1909); Scottish Am. M. Co. v. Butler, 99 Miss. 56, 57, 71, 54 So. 666 (1910); Earnest v. Little River L. & L. Co., 109 Tenn. 427, 75 S. W. 1122, 1127 (1902). ^^ East Jellico Coal Co. v. Hays, 133 Ky. 4, 117 S. W. 307 (1909); Armijo v. Armijo, 4 N. Mex. 133, 13 Pac. 92 (1883). '^ Toltec Ranch Co. v. Cook, 191 U. S. 532, 542 (1903). ^ Field V. Peoples, 180 111. 376, 383, 54 N. E. 304 (1899); Bellefontaine Co. v. Nied- ringhaus, 181 111. 426, 55 N.E. 184 (1899). Cf. La Salle v. Sanitary District, 260 111. 423, 429, 103 N. E. 175 (1913); Ames, Lectures on Legal Hist. 197; 3 Anglo- American Essays, 567. ^ Camp n. Camp, 5 Conn. 291 (1824); Price v. Lyon, 14 Conn. 279, 290 (1841); Coal Creek, etc. Co. v. East Tenn. I. & C. Co., 105 Tenn. 563; 59 S. W. 634, 636 (1900).