TITLE BY ADVERSE POSSESSION 157 the time which has run in favor of the possession held by A. He does not acquire the possessory title of his predecessor. It is not necessary to consider the true owner as restored to constructive possession, as his right of possession continues; and he may be re- garded as acquiring a new right of action against B, who by an independent act invades his right, which he should be allowed a new period of twenty years to pursue. But if there is privity, there is a continuation of the disseisin, and the entry of the suc- cessor "relates back" to the entry of him whose possessory right he holds.^^ This is for the reason that he succeeds by transfer to a possessory title already partly established. This substitution does not make a new cause of action, and the successive possessions blend into one. So the periods of adverse user of a way may be tacked where there is privity between the successive claimants. The consistent continued adverse user becomes conclusive evidence of right.9s If the title of the true owner is extinguished by the possession of independent trespassers, then the last of the trespassers can defend his possession against the true owner, although he may still be ejected by the first trespasser.®^ The statute will thus quiet a title in favor of A, which is not being asserted or exercised by him against the true owner, who has no right of action against A to recover the possession. Why should the possession of a subsequent trespasser enure to the benefit of a prior trespasser who is no longer claiming title? It may indeed be argued that, even where there is privity a new cause of action accrues against each successive wrongdoer and that the statute of limitations should always begin to run afresh. This would prevent tacking even cases in which there is privity, and it has been so held in England as to chattels, and in South Carolina as to both chattels and land except in case of descent.®^ 95 Davock V. Nealon, 58 N. J. L. 21, 32 Atl. 675 (1895); Sawyer v. Kendall, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 241, 244 (1852); Witt v. St. Paul & N. P. Ry. Co., 38 Minn. 122, 35 N. W. 862, 865 (1888); Christy v. Alford, 17 How. (U. S.), 601 (1854). "* McLean v. McRae, 50 N. S. R. 536, 33 Dom. L. Rep. 128, 132. '^ E. D. Armour, " Statute of Limitations as a Conveyancer," 3 Can. L. Times, 521; I Hayes, Conv. 268. »8 Miller v. Dell (1891), i Q. B. 468 (chattels); Beadle v. Hunter, 3 Strob. (S. C), 331 (1848); King V. Smith, Rice Law Rep. (S. C.) 10 (1838); Garrett v. Weinberg, 48 S. C. 28, 26 S. E. 3, 18 (1896). See Potts v. Gilbert, 3 Cruise Digest, R. P. 447; 3 Wash. C. C. 475 (1819).
