INDIRECT ENCROACHMENT ON FEDERAL AUTHORITY 257 physicians that all relations are intellectual. Whether any posited unity is imaginary or real can provoke endless debate. But these alluring problems can be dismissed as not germane to the present controversy. Since any application of the unit rule which uses as a base the value of total capital stock necessarily imposes taxation on a capitalization of earnings, it seems futile to argue whether a unity of "use and management" differs from a physical unity. The fact that the tangible property of the express companies in Ohio had an independent, easily assessable value makes it less easy to conceal the fact that the express business was being taxed. But the dis- guise seems apparent enough in the case of railroads and telegraphs. There is no denying that part of Mr. Justice White's opinion which says that it cannot be "contended that the tax here involved is not a tax on interstate commerce, in view of the fact that, from the nature of the criteria of value adopted, an aliquot part of the avails and receipts of the company of every kind is added to the taxing value in the State of Ohio." ^° There is but one answer to the query he propounds: "How, I submit, can it now be announced that there is an imaginary unity between personal property widely separated because that property has a common owner, without, at the same time, reversing the settled adjudications of this court on the subject of the power of a State to tax the earnings from interstate commerce?" ^"^ The answer is that the taxing of such earnings is accomplished in a different way from the ways previously declared unconstitutional. Whether the difference makes a difference is another question. The court's way out of such difficulties is to distinguish between direct and indirect burdens on interstate commerce. But such distinctions have to be fortified by something more than afibdng labels. Not infrequently the labels are masks for changed views of policy. Yet in many cases they express substantial differences of effect. Whether they do in the present instance will be con- sidered later. The opinion of Chief Justice Fuller hardly touches the question. But the case did not end here. The attorneys for the companies presented a petition for a rehearing, fortified by elaborate argu- 100 165 U. S. 194, 248-49, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 30s (1897). 1°^ Ihid., 194, 251-52.
