294 HARVARD LAW REVIEW as to the best course to pursue, and a warning to reach port at dawn. These advices were followed or disregarded by the captain as he saw fit. The ship was sunk without warning by a submarine and in a petition to determine liability, held, that the petitioner was not liable as not negligent, or if negli- gent, such negligence was not the proximate cause of the injury. The Lusi- iania, 251 Fed. 715. As the existence of the submarine zone was known to all, the passengers covild expect no more of the petitioner than that he use due care under the circumstances, the submarine menace being a circumstance. See 31 Harv. L. Rev. 306. The disregard of the advices, based on observations and sub- marine activities, can scarcely be justified on the grounds that the commanding officer of a merchantman be left free to exercise his own judgment. The ad- vices and previous sinkings showed the menace to be at its height off the im- mediate south coast of Ireland, and the reasonableness of a course aroimd the north of Ireland or one farther south, putting in at a different port, seems to have been overlooked. See Express Co. v. Kounize Bros. , 8 Wall. (U. S.) 342 ; The George Nicholaus, Fed. Cas., No. 13,578; The Union Insurance Co. v. Dexter, 52 Fed. 152. In order to reach port at dawn, why slacken speed in the danger zone instead of farther out at sea? Agaia it is not so clear that the crew was free from negligence, as negligence is not to be measured by poise of tempera- ment, excitability, or the reverse. See Bessemer Land Co. v. Campbell, 121 Ala. 50, 60. The illegal intervening act, as any other intervening act, would break the chain of causation only if it could not have been anticipated. Filson V. Pacific Express Co., 84 Kan. 614, 114 Pac. 863, 29 Harv. L, Rev. 453. See J. Smith, "Legal Cause in Actions of Tort," 25 bUrv. L. Rev. 103, 121. That the Lusitania did not anticipate the sinking is not so clear as the court seems to think. On the two previous voyages, the Lusitania hoisted the American flag and their act was justified on the grounds that Germany had announced her intention to sink British merchantmen on sight. It is unfortunate that the decision was not confined more strictly to the facts and a proper appUca- tion of the law thereto. Reformation of Instruments — Reformation for Mistake of Law. — A written contract contained, after the description of the estates and specified properties to be conveyed, the words, "and all other improvements." The parties had previously agreed, orally, that certain sugar miUs and machinery should be excepted, but no mention of this was made in the contract. The defendant by his answer, in effect a bill in equity, seeks reformation of the con- tract. Held, that equity will reform for mutual mistake of law where the con- tract fails to express the intention of the parties. Philippine Sugar, etc. Co. v. Philippine Islands, 247 U. S. 385. For a general discussion of the principles involved, see Notes, page 283. Sales — Conditional Sales — Right of Vendor Versus Stjbvendee. — Plaintiff sold an automobile to X. The title thereto was to remain in the plaintiff until the note, given for the residue of the purchase price, had been paid. X sold the automobile to the defendant, a bond fide purchaser without notice. Plaintiff sues the defendant in replevin. Held, the plaintiff can re- cover. Gamble v. Shingler, 96 S. W. 705 (Ga.). If a vendor transfers possession of the goods to the vendee, but retains legal title as security, the sale is conditional. Sumner v. Woods, 67 Ala. 139; Williston, Sales, § 7. The vendee may transfer his beneficial interest to a third person. Nafl Cash Register Co. v. Wapples, 52 Wash. 657, loi Pac. 227. If he assumes to transfer more, it is a conversion, and the vendor, at common law, is not estopped, despite the deceptive situation created by conditional sales, from immediately pursuing his rights against a bond fide subvendee.
