296 HARVARD LAW REVIEW NATIONAL Law Digest, §§ 1237, 1238. By limiting such determination to the single circumstance of the flag she is entitled to fly, Article 57 of the Declara- tion of London, therefore, purported to change the law of nations; but the neutral and belligerent powers in the present war have not considered that declaration as binding. See "Diplomatic Correspondence between the United States and the Belligerent Governments" in Sup. to 9 Amer. Jour, of Int. Law, July, 1915, 1-8; Declaration of London Order in Council, No. 2, 1914, Ibid., 14. However, the Order in Council adopting Article 57 itself pur- ported to preclude the prize court from going behind the flag a vessel is en- titled to fly to ascertain its actual ownership. But an Order in Council is executive not legislative in character and so, unlike an Act of Parhament, cannot change municipal law. The Zamora, [1916] 2 A. C. 77. See 3 Philli- MORE, International Law, 3 ed., 654. In holding the prize court not bound by the Order in Council and in adhering rather to international law, the de- cision in the principal case, therefore, seems sound. Wills — Revocability of Joint Wills. — Husband and wife made a joint win. The property devised was certain land of the husband's, certain land of the wife's and ten acres in which each owned a moiety. All of the wife's interest was devised to the defendants, — the grandchildren; while all of the husband's interest, excepting a small fraction, was devised to the com- plainant and another daughter. The wife died and her devises were probated. The husband then conveyed his interest, contrary to the wiU, to the grand- children by deed to take effect upon his death. On the death of the husband, complainant brings suit in the natuje of specific performance to enforce the provisions in her favor. Held, equity wiU grant the reUef. Williams et al. v. Williams, 96 S. E. 749 (Va.). A joint will is revocable by either party as to that respective party's dis- position. See ScHOULER, Wills, 5 ed., 458 a. But equity will act to prevent the surviving testator of a joint or a mutual will from defeating the object of the will, providing there was a contractual relation and sufficient considera- tion between the cotestators. Dufour v. Pareia, 1 Dick. 419; Edson v. Parsons, 155 N. Y. 555, 50 N. E. 265; Deseumeur v. Rondel; 76 N. J. Eq. 394, 74 Atl. 703. See 28 Harv. L. Rev. 248-50. Such prevention is, however, purely an equitable defense and does not affect the legal relationship. See Sumner v. Crane, 155 Mass. 483, 29 N. E. 1151; Albery v. Sessions, 2 Ohio N. P. 237; Peoria Humane Society v. McMurtrie, 229 111. 519, 82 N. E. 319; Buchannan V. Anderson, 70 S. C. 454, 50 S. E. 12. See also 28 Harv. L. Rev. 248. The test of consideration is no different from that of ordinary contracts. The ques- tion, however, often arises as to what evidence is necessary to estabUsh the contractual relation between the testators. As shown by the principal case direct evidence is unnecessary. The instrument itself presumptively favors this view inasmuch as it has all the earmarks of a contract. And where a husband and wife devise to near of kin, the devise of itself may be sufficiently indicative since the co-testators have an obviously mutual interest in such reciprocal or joint devises. Frazier v. Patterson, 243 111. 80, 90 N. E. 216. See Bowery. Daniel, 198 Mo. 289, 95 S. W. 347, 359; Campbell v. Dunkel-berger, 153 N. W. 56, 58 (la.). See contra, Ginn v. Edmundson, 173 N. C. 85, 91 S. E. 696.
