344 HARVARD LAW REVIEW of position.^^^ In equity generally the better view is expressed by Stinness, C. J., in Chase v. Chase:^^^ "Laches, in legal significance, is not mere delay, but delay that works a disadvantage to another. So long as parties are in the same condition, it matters little whether one presses a right promptly or slowly, within limits allowed by law; but when, knowing his rights, he takes no step to enforce them until the condition of the other party has, in good faith, become so changed that he cannot be restored to his former state, if the right be then enforced, delay becomes inequitable, and operates as an estoppel against the assertion of the right. The disadvantage may come from loss of evidence, change of title, intervention of equities and other causes, but when a court sees negligence on one side and injury therefrom on the other, it is a ground for denial of reUef." ^^^ There is no reason, however, why delay longer than the period covered by the statute of limitations should not, without more, bar the plaintiff.^^" If after the receipt of the money the situation of the defendant has so altered that he cannot restore it without suffering a detri- ment which he would not have incurred had it not been for the '" Henson v. Gulp, 157 Ky. 442, 163 S. W. 455 (1914); Davis v. Dudley, 70 Me. 236 (1879); Prout V. Wiley, 28 Mich. 164 (1873) (semble); Allen v. Poole, 54 Miss. 323 (1877) {semble); Thomas v. Pullis, 56 Mo. 211 (1874); Emmons v. Murray, 16 N. H. 385 (1844); Wheaton v. East, 5 Yerg. (Tenn.) 41, 62 (1833); Gillespie v. Bailey, 12 W. Va. 70 (1877) (semble). 15* 20 R. I. 202, 203, 37 Atl. 804 (1897). 159 Jonathan Mills Mfg. Go. v. Whitehurst, 60 Fed. 81 (1894); O'Brien v. Wheelock, 78 Fed. 673 (1897); Wheeling Bridge Go. v. Reymann Go., 90 Fed. 189 (1898); Hanchett V. Blair, 100 Fed. 817 (1900); London Bank v. Horton & Go., 126 Fed. 593, 601 (1903); Shea V. Nilima, 133 Fed. 209 (1904); Haney v. Legg, 129 Ala. 619, 30 So. 34 (1900); Pratt Land Go. v. McGlain, 135 Ala. 452, 33 So. 185 (1902) {semble); Hovey v. Brad- bury, 112 Gal. 620, 44 Pac. 1077 (1896); Ex-Mission Go. v. Flash, 97 Gal. 610, 32 Pac. 600 (1893); Brake v. Payne, 137 Ind. 479, 37 N. E. 140 (1893); Lindell Real Estate Go. V. Lindell, 142 Mo. 61, 43 S. W. 368 (1897); Fitzgerald v. Gonstr. Go., 44 Neb. 463, 62 N. W. 899 (189s); Daggers v. Van Dyck, 37 N. J. Eq. 130 (1883); Tynan v. Warren, Si N. J. Eq. 313, 31 Atl. 596 (1895); Lundy v. Seymour, 55 N. J. Eq. i, 35 Atl. 893 (1896); Law V. Smith, 59 Atl. 327, 68 N. J. Eq. 81 (1904); Farr v. Hauenstein, 69 N. J. Eq. 740 (1905); Parker v. Bethel Hotel Go., 96 Tenn. 252, 34 S. W. 209 (1896); Hamil- ton V. Dooly, 15 Utah, 280, 49 Pac. 769 (1897); TidbaU's Executors v. Shenandoah Bank, 42 S. E. 867 (W. Va.) (1902); Ludington v. Patton, in Wis. 208, 86 N. W. 571 (1901); Lindsay Petroleum Go. v. Hurd, L. R. 5 P. G. 221 (1874); Erlanger v. Som- brero Go., 3 App. Gas. 1218, 1279 (1878). 1*° Gray v. Goddard, 90 Gonn. 561, 98 Atl. 126 (1916); Shelburne v. Robinson, 8 111. 597 (1846); Ely V. Norton, i Hals. (N. J. L.) 187 (1822). See Fitzsimmons ». Johnson, 90 Tenn. 416 (1891).
