396 HARVARD LAW REVIEW The tax, then, was on the interstate business and not on the property at its value as a going concern. When we seek for the reason why this tax was not on the property as a going concern, we find that it is because there was another tax on the property as a going concern. The reason is not completely satisfying. Disre- garding w6rds and looking to substance, we do not readily perceive why one tax as well as the other cannot be on the property as a going concern, nor why one as well as the other is not on the busi- ness. There is ample reason why the legitimacy of one may depend on the presence or absence of the other, and there is no just ground for complaint because the court picked for slaughter the one that was before it. Since the state should not have both, but either would be allowable if alone, the designation of the good and the bad is wisely determined in accordance with the formal Hne of demarca- tion which the court had previously estabUshed. Mr. Justice Holmes correctly states the traditional theory that the state can tax the property at its value as a going concern, but cannot tax Gross Receipts, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 284 (1872), proceeded was that the corporation was a domestic one, and that this ground of the decision was not overruled in the Philadel- phia Steamship case, note 19, supra. In 1875, Railroad Co. v. Maryland, 21 Wall. (U. S.) 456 (1874), considered in 31 Harv. L. Rev. 578-79, sustained a charter pro- vision requiring an interstate railroad corporation to pay to the chartering state semi-annually one-fifth of its total gross passenger receipts. Ashley v. Ryan, 153 U. S. 436, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 865 (1894), 31 Harv. L. Rev. 580-81, and Kansas City, M. & B. R. R. Co. V. Stiles, 242 U. S. in, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 58 (1916), 31 Harv. L. Rev. 599-600, sustained charter provisions requiring a charter fee or an annual excise measured by total capital stock. The idea in these cases seemed to be that a state can put any price it pleases on the grant of a charter to be a corporation. International & G. N. Ry. Co. v. Anderson County, 246 U. S. 424, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 370 (1918), however, implies that provisions of a police character in corporate charters may by reason of changed con- ditions become invalid regulations of interstate commerce. These cases, however, do not bear on the question involved in the Galveston case, because the tax there in issue was not a franchise tax, nor was it, so far as appears, on the statute book when the complainant was incorporated. The franchise was taxed as property under another statute. Though Texas had avoided naming the "subject" it had selected for taxation, it had by selecting certain kinds of corporations engaged in a certain kind of occupation, imposed an occupation tax. The state court had called it an occupation tax, and had strongly implied, if not specifically declared, in a passage in the opinion immediately preceding that quoted in note 76, supra, that this construction was necessary in order to sustain the tax under the state constitution. The exaction, therefore, had to stand or fall as an occupation tax, quite independentlv of any peculiar power of a state over its own corperate creatures. The Philadelphia Steamship case, note 19, supra, at pages 342-43, shows that where a state seeks to justify its exaction as one on the franchise of domestic corporations, it must clearly indicate that this is the power and the only power that it is exercising.
