580 HARVARD LAW REVIEW Pac. R. R. Co. V. Public Service Commission, U. S. Supreme Court, October Term, 1918, No. 65. A corporation, in accepting the benefits permitted by statute, estops itself from contesting the validity of the statute. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Cowrie 6* N. W. Ry. Co., 123 Iowa, 543, 99 N. W. 181; Commonwealth v. Southern Pac. Co., 150 Ky. 97, 149 S. W. 1105. If, however, accepting the benefits is not a voluntary act, but is procured by duress, no estoppel is created. See Cicotte v. Wayne, 59 Mich. 509, 513, 26 N. W. 686, 687; Bigelow, Es- toppel, 6 ed., 646. In the principal case, it appears that the payment of the fee in return for the certificate was an act under duress. The issuance of the mortgage bonds was necessary to reimburse the railroad company for ex- penditures upon its property. Without the certificate, the bonds would be not only unmarketable but, if the statute were held applicable, would be ab- solutely void, and the corporation would be subject to heavy penalties. Scot- tish Union 6* National Ins. Co. v. Herriott, 109 Iowa 606, 80 N. W. 665; Swift v. United States, 11 1 U. S. 22. It is true the Missouri court later held the statute inapplicable, but the corporation was not bound to take the risk of the court deciding otherwise. Atchison, T. 6* S. Fe Ry. Co. v. O'Connor, 223 U. S. 280. Accordingly, the jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court was not excluded on the ground that the company waived its federal rights. Cress- will V. Grand Lodge, 225 U. S. 246. Since the charge for the certificate was fixed in proportion to the value of the bonds issued, the same being secured by railroad property most of which was in states other than Missouri, the burden on the railroad was apparently so heavy as to constitute an illegal interference with interstate commerce. Cf. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. i; International Paper Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U. S, 135. See JuDSON, Interstate Commerce, 3 ed., §§ 21, 22, 39. Seamen — Seamen's Act of 1915 — Deductions in American Port of Advances made to Foreign Seamen by a Foreign Vessel in Foreign Port. — The Seamen's Act (38 Stat, at L. 1165) provides that "every sea- man of a vessel of the United States shall be entitled to receive on demand from the master of the vessel to which he belongs a one-half part of the wages which he shall have then earned at every port where such vessel, after the voyage has been commenced, shall load or deliver cargo before the voyage is ended, and all stipulations in the contract to the contrary shall be void. Any failure on the part of the master to comply with this demand shall release the seaman from his contract, and he shall be entitled to full payment of the wages earned. . . . This section shall apply to seamen of foreign vessels while in the harbors of the United States, and the courts of the United States shall be open to such seamen for its enforcement." A British vessel in a British port made advances to the seamen, a lawful and customary practice by the law of England. On arriving in an American port the seamen demanded half the wages earned. The master deducted the advances made in Liverpool, and the seamen deserted and libeled the ship. Held, the libellants cannot recover. The Talus, U. S. Supreme Court, October Term, 1918, No. 392.^ It is well established that advances made to seamen by any vessel, American or foreign, in any port of the United States are within the statute and illegal. The Eudora, 190 U. S. 169; The Kestor, no Fed. 432. See 15 Harv. L. Rev. 411. The cases are in conflict as to advances made in a foreign port by an American or foreign vessel where by the law of such foreign country advances are allowed. The Windbrush, 250 Fed. 180; The Imberhorne, 240 Fed. 830; The Ixion, 237 Fed. 142; The Belgier, 246 Fed. 966. See 31 Harv. 1.. Rev. 1 169. The reasons for allowing such advances to be deducted on reaching an American port are that the contract is good by the law of the place where made, that Congress had no intention of rendering such contract void or of
