JURISDICTION TO TAX 617 This doctrine is clearly set forth by Mr. Justice Brewer in Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor: ^^^ " The burden of the contention of the express companies is that they have within the limits of the State certain tangible property, such as horses, wagons, etc.; that this tangible property is their only property within the State; that it must be valued as other like property, and upon such valuation alone can ttixes be assessed and levied against them. "But this contention practically ignores the existence of intangible property, or at least denies its liability for taxation. In the complex civilization of today a large portion of the wealth of a community con- sists in intangible property. ... It matters not in what this intangible property consists — whether privileges, corporate franchises, con- tracts, or obligations. It is enough that it is property which though in- tangible exists, which has value, produces income, and passes current in the markets of the world. To ignore this intangible property, or to hold that it is not subject to taxation at its accepted value, is to elimi- nate from the reach of the taxing power a large portion of the wealth of the country. Now, whenever separate articles of tangible property are joined together, not simply by a unity of ownership, but in a unity of use, there is not infrequently developed a property, intangible though it may be, which in value exceeds the aggregate of the value of the separate pieces of tangible property. Upon what theory of substantial right can it be adjudged that the value of this intangible property must be excluded from the tax lists, and the only property placed thereon be the separate pieces of tangible property? . . . "According to its figures this intangible property, its franchises, privileges, etc., is of the value of $12,000,000, and its tangible property of only $4,000,000. Where is the situs of this intangible property? Is it simply where its home office is, where is found the central directing thought which controls the workings of the great machine, or in the State which gave it its corporate franchise; or is that intangible prop- erty distributed wherever its tangible property is located and its work is done? Clearly, as we think, the latter. . . . That this is true is obvious from the result that would follow if all the States other than the one which created the corporation could and should withhold from it the right to transact express business within their limits. It might continue to own all its tangible property within each of those States, but unable to transact the express business within their limits, that $12,000,000 Fed. 126 (191 1); Wells Fargo & Co.'s Express v. Crawford County, 63 Ark. 576, 40 S. W. 710 (1897). ^^ 166 U. S. 185, 218-19, 223 (1897).
