862 HARVARD LAW REVIEW guished from a date, both days are to be included. Bellasis v. Hester, i Ld. Raym. 280; Chiles v. Smith, 52 Ky. 460; Leavenworth Coal Co. v. Barber, 47 Kan. 29, 27 Pac. 114. On the other hand, to prevent hardship or forfeiture, the general rule has often been discarded, the first and last days being in- cluded or excluded as the case required. Lester v. Garland, 15 Ves. 248; Pugh V. Duke of Leeds, Cowp. 714; Price v. Whitman, 8 Cal. 417; Taylor v. Brown, 5 Dak. 335, 40 N. W. 525. The law is even more uncertain when the last day falls on Sunday. With respect to contracts the Sunday is generally excluded, and performance may properly occur on Monday. Campbell v. Life Assurance Society, 41 Bosw. 299; Hammond v. Life Ins. Co., 10 Gray (Mass.) 306; Everett V. Stewart, 2 Conn. 69. But in the computation of statutory periods there can be no extension of time. Alderman v. Phelps, 15 Mass. 225; Patrick v. Faulke, 45 Mo. 312; Harrison v. Sager, 27 Mich. 476. Contra, West v. West, 20 R. I. 464, 40 Atl. 6. Statutes providing for the exclusion of Sunday have changed the latter rule in many jurisdictions. U. S. Rev. Stat., § 5013; N. Y. Code Civ. Proc, § 788; Kv. Civ. Code Prac, § 681. But curiously, these statutes have been considered as requiring performance on Saturday instead of permitting an extension until the following Monday, Frankfort v. Farmers^ Bank, 20 Ky. L. 1635, 49 S. W. 811; AllcJi v. Elliott, 67 Ala. 432. Again, it has been held that these statutes have no application where the period in question covers a number of years. Williams v. Lane, 87 Wis. 152, 58 N. W. 77; Haley v. Young, 144 Mass. 364. The many fine-spun distinctions drawn by the courts relative to this question seem imjustifiable. Computation of time is a matter purely of technical construction, and no reason appears why a definite principle should not be formulated to apply equally to aU cases. The rights and liabilities of parties with respect to a matter which so often leads to important consequences should be fixed and certain. Marriage — Validity — Marriage by Mail. — In a statutory action to recover damages for death caused by wrongful act, it was necessary for the plaintiff to show that she was the widow of the deceased. The deceased, while residing in Minnesota, had sent to the plaintiff, who was living in Missouri, a written agreement in duplicate, signed by him, whereby the parties under- took to assume from that date henceforth the relation of husband and wife. The woman had signed the papers and had sent one back to the man. Held, that this constituted a valid marriage. Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 254 Fed. 683 (Circ. Ct. App.). For a discussion of this case, see Notes, page 848. Municipal Corporations — Licenses — Validity of Ordinances Al- lowing Construction of Bridge Over Street and Vacating Street. — The city council by ordinance authorized the defendant refining company to build a bridge across a public street connecting its syrup house with its can factory. Later the council passed another ordinance vacating that portion of the street within the limits of the defendant's property. The company con- structed the bridge and fenced off both ends of the street. The plaintiffs petition to have the street reopened and the bridge and fences removed. Held, that the petition be granted. People ex rel. Burton v. Corn Products Refining Co., 121 N. E. 574 (lU.). It is settled that a municipality holds its streets in trust for the use of the public. Wiehe v. Pein, 281 111. 130, 117 N. E. 849; Winter Brothers v. Mays, 170 Ky. 554, 186 S. W. 127. Without express legislative authority a munici- pality may not grant to a private person the right to obstruct that use. Royster Guana Co. v. Lumber Co., 168 N. C. 337, 84 S. E. 346; Porche v. Barrow, 134 La. 1090, 64 So. 918. See 2 Elliott, Roads and Streets, 3 ed., § 836. In holding that a city has no power to authorize the construction of a bridge over
