Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 32.djvu/943

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907
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
907

INDIRECT ENCROACHMENT ON FEDERAL AUTHORITY 907 his assumptions, his economics is satisfactory. He has some excuse for neglecting the fact that sales of foreign goods were discriminated against, since Marshall in the majority opinion did not mention the point and declared broadly that so long as the goods remain imports, their sale in the normal way is immune from state taxation. But Marshall would never have allowed a discriminatory tax on sales of imported goods even by retailers after the articles had ceased to be technical imports within his original-package rule. He ex- pressly says that "we do not mean to give any opinion on a tax discriminating between foreign and domestic articles," ^^ although the language of the Maryland Act, warranted placing the decision on the ground of such discrimination. If we take the case on the assumptions on which the majority and minority proceeded, we have the ruling that a general tax on all wholesalers of goods for use within the state cannot be imposed on those wholesalers who deal exclusively in goods of foreign origin which have not previously been sold or taken from their original package. Such a tax is not within the letter of the constitutional prohibition. It adds to the price of foreign goods no more than it adds to the price of home-made articles. Its encroachment on federal authority is indirect, remote, and negligible. To exempt sales of imports from burdens which sales -of domestic goods must bear confers a positive benefit upon dealers in foreign goods, and thereby bestows a bounty on importation. Yet Marshall seemed to think that to deny the bounty would be to impose a burden. Now that the federal tax on net income is held not to be a tax on exports although the income taxed is from an exporting business,^^ a state tax on net income must be permitted to reach income from the sale of imports and escape conviction on the charge of being a tax on imports. Mr. Brown, therefore, if he were doing business in Mary- land to-day, would find that he had to include all income from his wholesale business in making his returns for the assessment of a general state income tax, notwithstanding the fact that he was a dealer in imports. Thus Brown v. Maryland ^^ has now technical, rather than substantial, importance. It does not stand in the way " 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 419, 449 (1827). " Peck & Co. V. Lowe, 247 U. S. 165, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 432 (1918), 32 Harv. L. Rev. 639.

  • ^ Note 6, supra.