Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 4.djvu/117

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HARVARD LAW REVIEW.
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EQUITY JURISDICTION. • 10 1 ancient ; that, while it has been subject to changes, the changes in it have been very slow and gradual ; and that it is almost a total stranger to modern ideas, with the exception of such as have been infused into it by equity. By the Roman law, every human being who had rights (other than such as were merely personal), or was subject to obligations or duties (other than such as were merely personal), had two per- sonalities {personas), one natural, the other legal, artificial, and ficti- tious ; and it was in the latter that his rights were vested, and upon the latter that his obligations and duties were imposed. It was a peculiarity of the legal personality that, being the creature of law, it continued to exist so long as there was any reason for its existence. It was not affected, therefore, by the death of the natural person, but continued its existence in the natural person's successor or heir (Jiceres)} It followed, therefore, that every natural person who had rights, or was subject to obligations or duties, at the time of his death, necessarily had a successor or heir, who possessed all his rights and was subject to all his obligations and duties. More- over, every person's successor or heir was either such person as he himself appointed by his will Qiceres /actus), or, if he made no appointment, such person as was designated by law (JicBres natus). An heir designated by law became such for his own benefit alone. An heir appointed by will was required to pay such legacies as were given by the will, subject to which he also took the inheri- tance for his own benefit. In respect to the obligations and duties to which the deceased was subject at the time of his death, there was no difference between the hcEres factiis and the hceres nains ; for such obligations and duties fell, necessarily and by operation of law, upon the one and the other, without distinction. So com- pletely, indeed, was the heir of the deceased person identified with the deceased, that the law made no distinction between the estate of the one and that of the other, nor between the debts of the one and those of the other. If, therefore, an insolvent heir succeeded to a solvent inheritance, the creditors of the heir had as much right to be paid their debts out of that inheritance as the creditors of the deceased had ; and if a solvent heir succeeded to an insol- vent inheritance, the creditors of the deceased had as much right to be paid out of the heir's own estate as his own creditors had ; and the only way of avoiding this last consequence of becoming a 1 See Maine, Ancient Law (4th ed.), 181-8.