CONTRACTS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE. 133 is unanswerable : " A general covenant, therefore, to retire from trade altogether might reasonably be taken from a telegraphic instrument-maker ; Bass' and Allsopp's Ales were known the world over, and Mudie made no difficulty in sending books round the kingdom, and even abroad ; a general covenant might also be asked from them." Keeler v. Taylor (1866). ^ Bill in equity for an account, etc. On demurrer to bill for an account upon an agreement to pay 1^50 for all scales made for any one except the complainant. The agree- ment was held invalid, because unreasonable. Taylor v. Blanchard (i866).2 A contract not to manufacture or sell shoe-cutters in the State of Massachusetts was held invalid. But in the light of later, more authoritative, because better-consid- ered, cases, I submit that this and other old cases included in the list of cases at the head of this paper, as well as Bishop v. Palmer,^ are not good authorities now, and would not be followed. Wright V. Ryder (1868).* An agreement not to run a steam- boat for ten years in the waters of California, etc., was held void. Although it was held that a condition in restraint of trade run- ning through the whole State is void, the court recognized insen- sibly the true test to be that of reasonableness (p. 358). We need not examine this case further, because it was overruled in the U. S. Supreme Court, 20 Wall. 64, which we will examine when we come to it. Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont (1869).^ Bill in equity to restrain violation of an agreement not to carry on, in any part of Europe, the manufacture of certain leather cloth. The agreement was held valid, because reasonable. James, V. C, said (p. 90) : " The truth is that all the cases, when they come to be examined, according to my view of it, establish this principle, that all restraints upon trade are bad, as being in violation of public policy, unless they are natural, and not unreasonable for the protection of the parties." So in 1886, in Smith's Appeal,^ Trunkey, J., well states: " . . . In such case, the same public policy enables him to enter into any stipulation, however restrictive it is, proved the restriction, in the judgment of the court, is not unreasonable, having regard to the subject-matter of the contract."
- 53 Penn. St. 467. * 36 Cal. 342.
2 13 Allen, 370. 5 39 L. J. Ch. 86; s. C, L. R. 9 Eq. 345. 8 (1888) 146 Mass. 469. 6 6 Atl. Rep. 251, at 253.
