Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 4.djvu/214

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198
HARVARD LAW REVIEW.
198

198 HARVARD LAW REVIEW, [but our system, unlike the Roman law, does not afford a remedy even for mental suffering which results from mere contumely and

  • 'insult, from an intentional and unwarranted violation of the

" honor " of another.^ It is not however necessary, in order to sustain the view that the common law recognizes and upholds a principle applicable to cases of invasion of privacy, to invoke the analogy, which is but superficial, to injuries sustained, either by an attack upon reputation or by what the civilians called a violation of honor ; for the legal doctrines relating to infractions of what is ordinarily termed the common-law right to intellectual and artistic property are, it is believed, but instances and applications of a general right to privacy, which properly understood afford a remedy for the evils under consideration. The common law secures to each individual the right of deter- mining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others. ^ Under our system of government, he can never be compelled to express them (except when upon the witness-stand) ; and even if he has chosen to give them expression, he generally retains the power to fix the limits of the publicity which shall be given them. The existence of this right does not depend upon the particular feelings, in case of seduction, abduction of a child (Stowe v. Heywood, 7 All. 118), or removal of the corpse of child from a burial-ground (Me'agher v. Driscoll, 99 Mass. 281 ), are said to be exceptions to a general rule. On the other hand, injury to feelings is a recognized element of damages in actions of slander and libel, and of malicious prosecution. These distinctions between the cases, where injury to feelings does and where it does not constitute a cause of action or legal element of damages, are not logi- cal, but doubtless serve well as practical rules. It will, it is believed, be found, upon ex- amination of the authorities, that wherever substantial mental suffering would be the natural and probable result of the act, there compensation for injury to feelings has been allowed, and that where no mental suffering would ordinarily result, or if resulting, would naturally be but trifling,anrl,being unaccompanied by visible signs of injury,would afford a wide scope for imaginative ills, there damages have been disallowed. The decisions on this subject illustrate well the subjection in our law of logic to common-sense. ^ " Injuria, in the narrower sense, is every intentional and illegal violation of honour, i.e., the whole personality of another." "Now an outrage is committed not only when a man shall be struck with the fist, say, or with a club, or even flogged, but also if abusive language has been used to one." Salkowski, Roman Law, p. 668 and p. 669, n. 2.

  • "It is certain every man has a right to keep his own sentiments, if he pleases.

He has certainly a right to judge whether he will make them public, or commit them only to the sight of his friends." Yates, J., in Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2379 (1769).