224 HARVARD LAW REVIEW, The ratio decidendi of Leisy v. Hardin appears to be substan- tially this : The transportation of goods from one State to another is national in character, and requires a uniform rule. Congress, therefore, has exclusive power to regulate it. If Con- gress makes no regulations, it indicates its will that such com- merce shall be free and unrestricted. The legislation in question is a regulation which does restrict it, and is, therefore, void. If by ** free and unrestricted " the court mean anything more than freedom from such commercial regulations as require a uni- form rule affecting alike all the States, the inference is entirely un- justifiable, for it is only to this extent that Congress has exclusive jurisdiction over inter-state commerce. If Congress fails to act, all that is indicated is that it considers that there is no necessity for exercising its exclusive jurisdiction, — that is, making such regulations of commerce as should have a uniform rule in all the States. Certainly it cannot be inferred, from the mere inaction of Congress, that that body has thereby expressed its will that a State shall not exercise its police power upon inter-state com- merce, where the exercise of it does not involve the exercise of powers given exclusively to Congress. The question to be de- termined, then, in each case, is, whether the regulation is of a nature where there should be uniformity in all the States.^ Police regulations do not require a uniform rule for all com- munities. The dangers to the health, safety, and morals of their citizens differ in nature and importance in the different States, and police regulations in each State should be adapted to the edu- cation and habits of its citizens. In one place one kind of regu- lation may be effective, in another place some other regulation is required, and in some communities prohibitory regulations are I considered the only effective ones. Accordingly, the power to make police regulations was not delegated to Congress, but was reserved to the States respectively.^ Furthermore, the power to regulate inter-state commerce was given to Congress for com- mercial reasons, and the States cannot be supposed to have in- tended to deprive themselves of so important a power as its police power, except so far as is necessary to enable Congress to prop- erly exercise its power over inter-state commerce. As the mi- ^ See Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. Railway Co., 125 U. S. 465,482-483, per Mat- thews, J.
- United States v. Dewitt, 9 Wall. 41.
