324 HARVARD LAW REVIEW, the larger scope to its relief from the fact that each decision does not lay down a fixed rule applicable to all cases of this class, but only relieves against whatever fraud is working damage under the facts of each case. The distinction between the law of trade-marks and of cases analogous to trade-marks, I understand to be this: In cases of trade-mark there is a definite exclusive right, which may be ac- quired according to definite rules, and which may be infringed in certain definite ways. The right is recognized as being exclu- sively the plaintiff's, and, indeed, it is by virtue of his exclusive right that he gets relief. Unless he has a trade-mark within these technical rules he has no exclusive right and can get no relief, and the court will be bound by technical rules in determining whether he has a trade-mark or not. In cases analogous to trade- marks, the right of the plaintiff is only against a particular de- fendant by reason of his fraud, and the court will apply the equitable principle of the prevention of fraud to the circumstances of each case. The courts have recognized this distinction clearly. The reason- ing of the English courts in the late cases on the subject leave no doubt of it. In Lee v. Haley, L. R. 5 Ch. App. 155, the facts were as follows: The plaintiffs had carried on for some years at No. 22 Pall Mall, under the style of "The Guinea Coal Co.," a large business which had a considerable reputation. The defendant, who had been their manager, set up a rival business on the Strand imder the name of The Pall Mall Guinea Coal Co.," and soon removed to No. 46 Pall Mall. Many persons were misled into giving orders to the defendant, in the belief that his concern was that of the plaintiffs. The defendant set up in defence to a bill for an injunction by the plaintiffs that the plaintiffs habitually sold short weight, and that they had no exclusive right to the name "Guinea Coal Co.," which was used by various other estabhsh- ments about London. The court held that if the plaintiffs had been systematically carrying on a fraudulent trade, and deHvering short weight, it is beyond all question that it would not interfere to protect them in carrying on such trade. The court also held that, although the plaintiffs had no exclusive right to the name, an injunction to restrain the defendant from using the name "The Pall Mall Guinea Co.," in Fall Mallj was proper, on the ground
