Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 4.djvu/378

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362
HARVARD LAW REVIEW.

cipal, because it is quasi his act."[1] Later still, Blackstone repeats from the bench the language of Charles's day. "There is a difference between master and servant, but a sheriff and all his officers are considered in cases like this as one person." So his associate judge, Gould, "I consider [the under-sheriff's clerk] as standing in the place of, and representing the very persons of ... the sheriffs themselves."[2] Again, the same idea is stated by Lord Mansfield: "For all civil purposes the act of the sheriffs bailiff is the act of the sheriff."[3] The distinction taken above by Blackstone did not prevent his saying in his Commentaries that under-officers are servants of the sheriff;[4] and in Woodgate v. Knatchbull,[5] Ashurst, J., after citing the words of Lord Mansfield, adds, "This holds, indeed, in most instances with regard to servants in general;" and Blackstone says the same thing in a passage to be quoted hereafter.

Having thus followed down the fiction of identity with regard to one class of servants, I must now return once more to Lord Holt's time. In Boson v. Sandford,[6] Eyres, J., says that the master of a ship is no more than a servant, "the power which he hath is by the civil law, Hob. 111, and it is plain the act or default of the servant shall charge the owner." Again, in Turberville v. Stampe,[7] Lord Holt, after beginning according to the Roman law that "if my servant throws dirt into the highway I am indictable," continues, "So in this case, if the defendant's servant kindled the fire in the way of husbandry and proper for his employment, though he had no express command of his master, yet the master shall be liable to an action for damages done to another by the fire; for it shall be intended, that the servant had authority from his master, it being for his master's benefit." This is the first of a series of cases decided by Lord Holt[8] which are the usual starting-point of modern decisions, and it will be found to be the chief authority

  1. Lane v. Cotton, 1 Salk. 17, 18; s. c. 1 Ld. Raym. 646, Com. 100 (P. 12 W. III.).
  2. Saunderson v. Baker, 3 Wilson, 309 s. c. 2 Wm. Bl. 832; (T. 12 G. III. 1772).
  3. Ackworth v. Kempe, Douglas, 40, 42 (M. 19 G. III. 1778).
  4. 1 Bl. Comm. 345, 346.
  5. 2 T. R. 148, 154 (1787).
  6. 1 Shower, 101, 107 (M. 2 W. III.).
  7. 1 Ld. Raym. 264 (M. 9 W. III.); s. c. 3 id. 250, Carthew, 425, Com. 32, 1 Salk. 13, Skinner, 681, 12 Mod. 151, Comb. 459, Holt, 9.
  8. Jones v. Hart, 2 Salk. 441; s. c. 1 Ld. Raym. 738, 739 (M. 10 W. III.); Middleton v. Fowler, 1 Salk. 282 (M. 10 W. III.); Hern v. Nichols, 1 Salk. 289.