and at the least to include within the term "liberty" the right to follow any lawful calling, natural and reasonable as such a construction may at first glance appear, it seems, upon examination, to have little real foundation either in history or principle. The use of the term "civil" to denote the ordinary substantive rights, other than life and property, which every citizen has, and constantly exercises in his daily life, is of recent origin, probably not extending back farther than the War of the Rebellion, and a construction of the term "liberty" making it coextensive with "civil rights" in that limited sense of the term "civil," seems to be unhistorical and arbitrary. One is obliged to ask why it should include thus much and no more. If it includes the right to pursue any lawful trade, why should it not include the right to worship in any lawful manner, to print or speak in any lawful manner, and to exercise one's political privileges in any lawful manner? Possibly, if the point should arise, it would be held to include all the above liberties, although the writer has not found any statements in the books to that effect. The reasons for supposing that the term should not be so interpreted have already been set forth.
Charles E. Shattuck
CAMBRIDGE, 1890.
