28 HARVARD LAW REVIEW, acres of land, but did not describe the land or its value. The plaintiff stood alone on the sheriff's deed. If the judgment for alimony was void, the sheriff's deed was also void. " A divorce suit is a proceeding in rem, and the res is the status of the plaintiff in relation to the defendant, to be acted on by the court. There was nothing before the court to act on in regard to alimony in this case." Thus, " an action for divorce and alimony " is really a combi- nation of two differing suits. One suit is in rem, to change the status of the plaintiff, i. e., for divorce. The other suit, joined with it, is ift personam, for money, alimony. These suits are quite distinct in principle, and proceed on different grounds. Or, rather, the suit for divorce simply is founded on the court's statu- tory right to grant it, when a statutory cause for divorce is alleged and apparently proved ; while the suit for alimony is founded on that, and something else besides.^ The subject will be made clearer by assuming a hypothetical case and a specified decree. Suppose a Mrs. Roe alleges
- ' cruelty," with its specifications, and obtains on that alone a
decree, say, of $1,200 yearly income. Does the mere allegation and proof of " cruelty " give her the right to $1,200 alimony per year? or the right to have the court grant such?^ Mrs. Roe's petition scantily alleges domicil and a statutory cause for release from her marriage vows, but no more. That renders the suit for divorce, indeed, complete. But there is no suit for alimony intertwined with that, except that incomplete portion of it, — the prayer for alimony. Does that state the title to $1,200 per year? Is all that is necessary to get that a perfectly general prayer, with not a solitary fact to cling to? In Bushnell z;. Avery ^ the court said: "No such condition of facts is set forth as entitles the plaintiff to the relief prayed for. . . . The stating part of the bill cannot be enlarged by the terms of the prayer for relief" * 1 " Probable cause for the suit, the wife's necessity, and the husband's ability, are the controlling considerations in determining whether the alimony and suit money will be allowed." Burgess v. Burgess, 25 111. App. 526. ^ " In England alimony is made the subject of a special application or petition, separate and distinct from the libel for divorce. But we think ours is the better prac- tice, in that it accords with the analogies of equity procedure, by including in the same bill all the allegations of fact upon which it may be necessary for the court to adjudi- cate for the purpose of a complete determination of all matters involved in this action." Damon v. Damon, 28 Wis. 514. » 121 Mass. 148. * See also Belle v. Merrifield, 109 N. Y. 202.
