RECENT CASES. 95 recover; that, if anything, the plaintiff was more in fault, as he had put it in the power of S to obtain the money; and that, apart from negligence, it was a case of equal equities, in which the loss must remain where it fell. United States v. National Exchange Bank, 45 Fed. Rep. 163. The decision of this case is correct, but the grounds upon which it is placed are, with deference, hardly satisfactory. As the check was given by the drawer directly to S. the title to the obligation must have passed to S, just as the title to a chattel passes to a fraudulent purchaser. And S, having obtained the title by fraud, must also have acquired a right to indorse in the name by which he had been designated as payee by the drawer. The bank, therefore, having no notice of the fraud, and paying to S on his indorsement in the name of A, strictly complied with the order of the drawer, and could in no wise be responsible. Bills and Notes — Collateral Agreement between Indorser and In- dorsee. — Action by indorsees against the indorser of a promissory note. The defence was failure to present the note for payment at maturity. Plaintiffs offered to prove at the trial that at the time of indorsement defendant verbally waived demand upon the makers at maturity, notice thereof, and of non-payment. Held, that evidence of such collateral agreement was not admissible. Farwell et al. v. St. Paul Trust Co., 48 N. W. Rep. 326 (Minn.). Carriers — Shipment and Delivery of Live-stock. — A carrier of live-stock cannot make a valid agreement to receive and deliver all stock consigned to it exclu- sively at and through the stock-yards of another corporation, and to charge the shipper or consignee, for the benefit of such corporation, a certain sum for the use of its yards, in addition to charges for transportation. Covington Stock- Yards Co. v. Keith, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 461. Constitutional Law — Interstate Commerce. — A statute of Kentucky im- poses a license tax on peddlers, and makes voidable, as against a peddler failing to pay the license, all contracts of sale made by such peddler. Held, in action on a promis- sory note, that the statute applies to citizens of another State bringing goods into Kentucky to sell, and that, as so construed, it is not inconsistent with Art. I., sec. 8, or Art. IV., sec. 2, of the Constitution of the United States. A'ash v. Farley, 15 S. W. Rep. 862 (Ky.). Constitutional Law — Interstate Commerce — Licensing of Tug-boats. — Tug-boats employed in towing vessels engaged in interstate commerce into and through the harbor of Chicago and along the Chicago river, thereby assisting such vessels to begin and end their voyages to other States, are themselves engaged in interstate commerce. A city ordinance, prohibiting the use of such tug-boats, except under license from the city, is an unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce. Harmon v. City of Chicago, 26 N. E. Rep. 697 (111.). Contracts — Breach — Recovery of Consideration. — The plaintiff had leased to the defendant several printing-presses at a fixed sum, to be paid in monthly instalments, with an option of final purchase. The defendant gave several promissory notes as security for the payment of the several sums when due. The plaintiff having, in accordance with the terms of the lease, on the failure of one monthly payment taken possession of the presses, brought suit on the notes. Held, that the covenants were dependent, and the agreement having thus been rescinded, there could be no recovery on the notes for failure of consideration. Campbell Printing Press and Manufacturing Co. v. Hickok, 21 Atl. Rep. 362 (Pa.). Corporations — Telegraph and Telephone. — A telegraph company, organ- ized under the telegraph act, may in the exercise of its proper powers under that act condemn land for the erection of a line of telephone. State v. Central New Jersey Tel. Co., 21 Atl. Rep. 460 (N. J.). Corporations — Ultra Vires Contract. — A corporation chartered "for the transportation of passengers in railroad cars, constructed and to be owned by the said company," under certain patents, and empowered to enter into contracts with other corporations " for the leasing or hiring and transfer to them" of their cars and other personal property, leased for ninety-nine years to another corporation in the same busi- ness all its property, including its cars, patents, and all contracts with railroad com- panies for the hire of its cars, and agreed that while the lease was in force it would not engage in the business of manufacturing and using or hiring cars. Held, that the cor-
