HARVARD
LAW REVIEW.
AGENCY.[1]
II.
THE history of agency as applied to contract is next to be dealt with. In this branch of the law there is less of anomaly and a smaller field in which to look for traces of fiction than the last. A man is not bound by his servant's contracts unless they are made on his behalf and by his authority, and that he should be bound then is plain common-sense. It is true that in determining how far authority extends, the question is of ostensible authority and not of secret order. But this merely illustrates the general rule which governs a man's responsibility for his acts throughout the law. If, under the circumstances known to him, the obvious consequence of the principal's own conduct in employing the agent is that the public understand him to have given the agent certain powers, he gives the agent those powers. And he gives them just as truly when he forbids their exercise as when he commands it. It seems always to have been recognized that an agent's ostensible powers were his real powers;[2] and on the other hand it always has been the law that an agent could not bind his principal beyond the powers actually given in the sense above explained.
There is, however, one anomaly introduced by agency even into the sphere of contract,—the rule that an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued on a contract made by an agent on his behalf;
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