204 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. Hibbard in Volume IV. of the Harvard Law Review, p. 70.) It would seem, however, that the courts would have reached a more equitable result if they had treated the act of the defendant as inflicting a permanent dam- age for which compensation could have been given once for all. It is hard to treat as a continuing wrong an act sanctioned by the Legislature. The case rather resembles the taking of property by right of eminent domain than a continuing trespass. Besides, as the defendant contended, the plaintiff had received no substantial damage, as he acquired the prop- erty at a lower rate than he could otherwise have done. The decision, in effect, makes him a present of the damages recovered from the company. Still, the rule in New York is settled that such acts as those of the defendant are continuing trespasses. The court, therefore, had to choose between unsettling the law and inflicting in a few cases severe hardship on the defendant. In this view of the case it is difficult to find fault with the decision. Alabama Claims Decision. — In Williams v. Heard? the United States Supreme Court has added another chapter to the interesting history of the Alabama Claims award. The question was this ; in 1882, it may be remembered, after paying off all the claims for direct losses, a sur- plus was found to be left over from the $15,000,000, and Congress thereupon voted to pay this to those who had paid high " war pre- miums " on insurance policies. Did this award pass as part of a bankrupt's property in an assignment made before 1882 ; that is, was there any such sufficient claim on this award as to be called property of the bankrupt? The courts of four States — Maryland in 1887, 2 Massachusetts in 1888, 8 Maine in 1889, 4 and New York in 1890 5 — decided that the award did not belong to the assignees. The Supreme Court, following Chief Justice Field's dissenting opinion in the Massachusetts case, now decides that it did go to them as part of the bankrupt's property. The State courts insisted as follows : That the Geneva tribunal awarded only for direct losses and expressly excluded payment for war premiums as contrary to international law. That the United States in its whole course was enforcing rights under the law of nations, and all that was allowed it was indemnity for those rights. That when she collected the award from England, she did so as a trustee for those whose claims she had been enforcing, i. e., the claims of those suffering direct loss. There was no pretence f hat the United States received money on any trust to pay war premiums. Hence the bankrupt had no claim sound- ing in trust against the fund received from England. The award by Congress, in 1882, was therefore an "act of grace and bounty," "a pure gratuity," " a simple gift " to those who had no claim on any one, either legal or equitable. As there was no claim, nothing could pass by assignment. This reasoning the Supreme Court entirely overrules. It first sets aside — very rightly, it would seem — the idea that any one had a claim to any part of the Geneva award. It denies that even the direct losers had a claim, or that the money was held in trust for them. Congress could dis- tribute or hold the money as it saw fit. l Vol. II. Supreme Court Rep. 885. 2 Brooks v. Ahrens, 68 Md. 212. 8 Heard v. Sturgis, 146 Mass. 545. * Kingsbury v. Mattocki, 17 Atl. Rep. 126. 6 Taft v. Warsily, 24 N. E. Kep. 826.
